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Abstract
This paper investigates the secret key authentication capacity region. Specifically, the focus is on a model where
a source must transmit information over an adversary controlled channel where the adversary, prior to the source’s
transmission, decides whether or not to replace the destination’s observation with an arbitrary one of their choosing
(done in hopes of having the destination accept a false message). To combat the adversary, the source and destination
share a secret key which they may use to guarantee authenticated communications. The secret key authentication
capacity region here is then defined as the region of jointly achievable message rate, authentication rate, and key
consumption rate (i.e., how many bits of secret key are needed).
This is the first of a two part study, with the parts differing in how the authentication rate is measured. In this
first study the authenticated rate is measured by the traditional metric of the maximum expected probability of false
authentication. For this metric, we provide an inner bound which improves on those existing in the literature. This is
achieved by adopting and merging different classical techniques in novel ways. Within these classical techniques, one
technique derives authentication capability directly from the noisy communications channel, and the other technique
derives its’ authentication capability directly from obscuring the source.
I. INTRODUCTION
Authentication is inherently a physical layer problem; any protocol that labels data as valid or invalid naturally
creates a bifurcation of the physical layer observations. What is clear is that this labeling should degrade the
performance of the communication system in comparison to a system which does not require authentication since
any possible observation which is labeled as inauthentic can no longer contribute to the probability of reliably
decoding. Our goal with this series of papers is to explore this trade-off. In particular, we focus on a model
previously considered by Lai et al. [1] and as a sub-case by Gungor and Koksal [2]. In this model, the source sends
information in the presence of an adversary that listens to the communication and can change what is received
by the true destination. On the other end, the communicating parties are allowed to share a secret key prior to
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2communications. For this model, our goal is to derive a classical information theoretic “rate region” that describes
the trade-off between information rate, authentication rate (to be defined), and the amount of secret key required
(termed the key consumption rate).
This work has been split into two papers since, in the course of our efforts to obtain the desired rate region
characterization, we discovered that the traditional metric for authentication rate (the maximum probability of false
authentication) does not necessarily represent how strong the authentication capability of the system is for a typical
use. In fact, the traditional metric is beholden to extremely unlikely events occurring in the communication channel;
for example, a noisy binary symmetric channel acting as a noiseless channel. Upon this discovery, we formulated a
new metric which only considers “typical” behaviour of the communication channel, with all other behavior being
written off as loss. Nevertheless, we still consider the traditional metric here, and favorably compare our results to
those existing in the literature. The splitting of the papers based upon choice of metric is done to allow flexibility in
how the results are presented, with the traditional metric’s dependence on unlikely empirical channel distributions
dictating a notation where the information theoretic terms are functions of probability distributions, while the new
metric allows for a (in our opinion) simpler presentation where the information theoretic terms are functions of
random variables.
Authentication is an important topic considered outside of the information theoretic literature. Some examples
include: Yu et al. [3] who used spread spectrum techniques in addition to a covert channel to ensure authentication,
Xiao et al. [4] who used the unique scattering of individual users in indoor environments to authenticate packets,
and Korzhik et al. [5] who make use of a (possibly noisy) initialization setup to create unique correlations which
then allow for detection. These methods, while perhaps more suitable for application, use tools that are insufficient
in determining the various information theoretic measures considered here. Instead, what they highlight is a concern
for authentication that should not be ignored. With this work, we hope to provide insight into the general problem,
and provide baselines to what is possible.
On the other hand, authentication has only somewhat been considered from the information theoretic viewpoint.
In particular, it can be argued that Blackwell et al. [6] and their study of the arbitrarily varying channel (AVC)
was the first true study of authentication. In particular, in the AVC, an adversary can at will choose the state of the
communication channel between the two communicating parties. This classic work and those that followed, such
as [7], [8], [9], all considered the maximum communication rate that can be obtained subject to an arbitrarily small
probability of error (over any choice of communication states by the adversary). Note, this indeed implies that a
decoded message would be authentic because the probability of error must take into account the adversaries actions.
In this vein, Ahlswede [10] considered the communication rate over an AVC when the source and destination share
a secret key. More specifically, Ahlswede gave the two communicating parties access to shared randomness, which
must be kept private from the adversary prior to transmission. For Ahlswede, allowing this secret key dramatically
improved the communication rate, essentially transforming AVCs into a compound channel.
While these papers do examine an aspect of authentication, one can also argue that they are much too strict
in their operational requirement. Today, the detection of the adversary’s involvement is a strong enough result for
many fields of security; for example, in quantum key distribution, a system is considered operational even though
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3the adversary can reduce the key rate to zero by measuring the data. In our case, it makes even more practical sense
to forgo such a harsh operational requirement. That is, if an adversary wanted to reduce the communication rate to
zero between two parties in practice, they would simply need a strong enough jammer. Of course, simply jamming
a signal is different than trying to have a node accept a fabricated message as authentic. This is the stance we adopt
here: when the adversary is attacking, a system is operational if it can decode the correct message or detect the
attack; when the adversary is not attacking, we want the system to communicate as much data as possible.
Adopting this viewpoint, works by Jiang [11], [12], Graves et al. [13], and Kosut and Kliewer [14] all consider
authentication over an AVC without a secret key. In particular, Jiang considered the sub-case of AVC where the
output of the AVC was independent of the legitimate parties input for all but a single channel state. Graves et al.
considered a general AVC where the adversary is given the side information of which message is being transmitted
while Kosut and Kliewer considered the general AVC case1. Each of these works avoids looking at the strength
of the authentication capability, and instead only considers the data rate given the maximum probability of false
authentication goes to zero.
Works considering a secret key and strength of the authentication capability have a genesis in that of Simmons [15],
who considered a special case of the model presented here with all channels noiseless. Since all channels were
noiseless, all authentication capability had to be derived from the secret key. This distinction fundamentally separates
the problems of keyless and secret key authentication; the former relies on exploiting the nature of the communication
channels, while the latter relies on exploiting a finite resource. Later came the works of Lai et al. [1] and that of
Gungor and Koksal [2], who both consider generalizations of Simmons’ model with noisy channels. Each of these
works has aspects which could be strengthened. Lai et al. require the amount of secret key bits to be asymptotically
negligible when compared with the blocklength of the transmission. In doing so, though, they can make no distinction
in the importance of verifying 10 versus 10, 000 bits of data. Meanwhile, Gungor and Koksal’s coding scheme is
inefficient and mismanages the key by unnecessarily using it in a way that favors the adversary. Furthermore, their
work does not attempt2 to explicitly derive such a region, instead opting for a presentation of error exponents.
Our works look to characterize this trade-off between information, authentication, and key consumption rate.
Towards the efforts (under the traditional metric), we are only able to derive an inner bound on the rate region
when considered over an arbitrary number of rounds of communication. To the credit of this inner bound, it improves
on all inner bounds previously appearing in literature (even that of our earlier work [16]). In comparison to Lai et
al., we shall measure the authentication relative to the block length, hence allowing the level of protection to scale
with the amount of data while our coding scheme will strictly improve on the rate region obtained by Gungor and
Koksal, and be presented as a rate region that is, in principal, computable. Our results are achieved by combining
a broadcast channel with confidential communications (see Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [17]) code adapted using a strategy
similar to that in [1], with the coding scheme of Simmons [15]. While it would be easy to construct a new “novel”
1We shall also be adopting the terminology of Authentication Capacity, first coined by Kosut and Kliewer. Although it should be noted we
are looking at a region, we adopt this terminology since the root requirement for a system to be operational is equivalent.
2Although we did endeavour to extract such a rate region from their works, we were unable to do so and instead had to settle for an outer
bound. Nevertheless, our results improve on this outer bound.
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4code, and present it as such, we feel that it is more important to emphasize that the coding scheme can be derived
through previously established concepts (with appropriate modifications).
We begin this discussion by thoroughly presenting the problem formulation (notation, model, operational defini-
tions) in Section II. It should be noted that these sections will differ between the two papers. With these in place,
we circle back to discuss in finer detail [1], [15], [2], and [17] before presenting our results in Section IV, and
giving examples in Section V. Proofs can be found in appendices.
II. FORMULATION
A. Notation
Uppercase letters will be used to denote random variables (RVs) and lowercase letters will be used to denote
constants. The probability of event A is denoted Pr(A). Function p with subscript RV will be used to denote the
probability distribution over the RV (i.e., pX(x) = Pr(X = x)). To simplify presentation, the subscript may be
suppressed when clear. Calligraphic font or curly brackets will be used to denote sets, for instance Y = {1, . . . , 10}.
The only exceptions to this are the set of positive real numbers, denoted R+, and the set of positive integers, denoted
Z+. Subscripts will generally be used for bookkeeping purposes, while | denotes the word “given,” and : “subject
to.”
The function × will be used to denote the Cartesian product. We will frequently need to use the Cartesian product
of n (where n will denote the block length of a given code) correlated RVs, constants, and sets. This need arises so
frequently that we denote these Cartesian products by bold face. For instance, X = ×ni=1Xi = (X1, . . . , Xn) and
X = ×ni=1X . When using this notation with a probability distribution, the terms in the product are uncorrelated.
For example, given a probability distribution t over X
t(x) =
n∏
i=1
t(xi)
for each x ∈ X .
The indicator function of an event A is denoted 1{A}, that is 1{A} = 1 if A occurs, otherwise 1{A} = 0.
The set of all probability distributions on a certain set, say X , is denoted by P(X ), likewise P(Y|X ) denotes
the probability distributions of Y conditioned on elements of X . The set P(Y  X ) represents a special subset of
P(Y|X ), where for each v ∈ P(Y  X ) and y ∈ Y there exists at most one x ∈ X such that v(y|x) > 0. Note,
for random variables X,Y, Z, if pY |X ∈ P(Y  X ), then X, Y, Z form a Markov chain, X c Y c Z.
Another special subset of the distributions is the possible “empirical distributions” (or type classes) for a given
n-length sequence, denoted Pn(·). The empirical distribution of sequence x, denoted px, is the distribution defined
by the proportion of occurrences of x in sequence x. In other words
px(b) ,
∑n
i=1 1{xi = b}
n
, ∀b ∈ X .
This follows similarly for empirical conditional distributions, but we further list the empirical distribution of the
conditioning value, such as Pn(Y|X ; ρ) for ρ ∈ Pn(X ). Here the empirical conditional distribution of y given x
is defined by
py|x(b|a) ,
∑n
i=1 1{yi = b}1{xi = a}∑n
i=1 1{xi = a}
, ∀a× b ∈ X × Y.
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5For each µ ∈ Pn(Y|X ; ρ) and ρ ∈ Pn(X ) the type class of µ given a x such that px = ρ is denoted
Tµ(x) ,
{
y : py|x = µ
}
.
Next, we need to define particular functions of probability distributions. For ρ ∈ P(X|U) and v ∈ P(Y|X ,U),
the distributions vρ ∈ P(Y|U) and v × ρ ∈ P(Y,X|U) are defined by
vρ(y|u) ,
∑
x∈X
v(y|x, u)ρ(x|u), ∀(y, u) ∈ Y × U
and
(v × ρ)(y, x|u) , v(y|x, u)p(x|u), ∀(x, y, u) ∈ X × Y × U .
When there is a dimensional mismatch in the above notation, it is to be treated as if the distribution are independent
of the missing dimension. For example, when v ∈ P(Y|X ) and ρ ∈ P(X|U), then
vρ(y|u) =
∑
x∈X
v(y|x)ρ(x|u).
Black board bold (other than the two exceptions discussed earlier) is used to denote functions which are averaged
over RVs or their distribution. Of particular importance is E which denotes the expectation operator. Other important
functions are entropy, mutual information, and Kullback-Leibler divergence, denoted (respectively) by
H(ρ|σ) = −
∑
u∈U
x∈X
ρ(x|u)σ(u) log2 ρ(x|u),
I(q, ρ|σ) =
∑
y∈Y,
x∈X ,
u∈U
q(y|x, u)ρ(x|u)σ(u) log2
q(y|x, u)
qρ(y|u)
= H(qρ|σ)−H(q|ρσ),
D(ρ||ω|σ) =
∑
x∈X ,
u∈U
ρ(x|u)σ(x) log2
ρ(x|u)
ω(x|u) .
for q ∈ P(Y|X ,U), ρ ∈ P(X|U), ω ∈ P(X|U), and σ ∈ P(U). Additionally, four other functions will be extremely
useful
F(µ||t, ρ|σ) , min
ζ∈P(Y,X|U):∑
y∈Y ζ(y,x|u)=ρ(x|u),∑
x∈X ζ(y,x|u)=µ(y|u)
D(ζ||t× ρ|σ)
= min
ζ∈P(Y,X|U):∑
y∈Y ζ(y,x|u)=ρ(x|u),∑
x∈X ζ(y,x|u)=µ(y|u)
∑
y∈Y,
x∈X ,
u∈U
ζ(y, x|u)σ(u) log2
ζ(y, x|u)
t(y|x)ρ(x|u) ,
Fn(µ||t, ρ|σ) , min
ζ∈Pn(Y,X|U ;σ):∑
y∈Y ζ(y,x|u)=ρ(x|u),∑
x∈X ζ(y,x|u)=µ(y|u)
D(ζ||t× ρ|σ),
Sa,b(µ, ν|ρ, σ) , I(µ, ρ|σ) + a− I(ν, ρ|σ) + |I(µρ, σ) + b− I(νρ, σ)|+ ,
Sa,b(ν|ρ, σ) , a− I(ν, ρ|σ) + |b− I(νρ, σ)|+
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Fig. 1. Channel model in the i-th round of communication where Grı´ma has chosen to interlope.
where, in addition to the previously defined distributions, µ ∈ P(Y|U) and t ∈ P(Y|X ). The need for function F
and Fn arises through Lemma 8, while S allows us to measure the secrecy of a channel.
For any a ∈ Rn, or set B ⊆ X , define the following absolute values:
|a| =
√√√√ n∑
i=1
|ai|
|ai|+ = ai1{ai > 0}
|ai|− = ai1{ai < 0}
|B| =
∑
x∈X
1{x ∈ B}.
Finally the O function from the Bachmann-Landau notation will be employed here. That is by writing g(x, n) =
f(x,O(h(n))), we are saying that there exists a constant ζ, independent of n, such that
|g(x)| ≤ max
t∈[−ζh(n),ζh(n)]
f(x, t).
B. Model
In this studies’ model, for j ∈ R+ rounds of communication, Alice (representative of the source) is connected
with Bob (representative of the destination) via a discrete memoryless-adversarial interlope channel(t, q) (DM-
AIC(t, q)), where t ∈ P(Y|X ) and q ∈ P(Z|X ). The DM-AIC(t, q), pictured in the i-th round in Figure 1, is
controlled by Grı´ma3 (representative of the adversary) who, prior to the communication round, decides if Bob
will receive the transmission from Alice or himself. When Grı´ma decides to send a message to Bob, instead of
allowing Alice to send the message to Bob, it will be called interloping. The t and q in a DM-AIC(t, q) specify
3Chosen for Grı´ma Wormtongue from Lord of the Rings by J.R.R. Tolkien. Grı´ma was an advisor to the King of Rohan, while secretly an
agent of Saruman. Thus his role was to listen to information presented to the King and manipulate it towards Saruman’s agenda. This seemed
more appropriate than “Eve,” since the adversary does not only take the role of eavesdropper.
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7the memoryless channels that connect Alice to Bob (if Grı´ma does not interlope) and Alice to Grı´ma respectively.
Hence when Grı´ma does not interlope, Bob will receive y with probability t(y|x) , ∏n`=1 t(y`|x`) given Alice
transmitted x. On the other hand, when Grı´ma does interlope, Grı´ma arbitrarily decides the value of y, and does
so as a function of his own current and previous rounds’ observations. In other words if Grı´ma interlopes in the
`-th, Bob will receive y with probability ψ`(y| ×`i=1 zi), where ψ` ∈ P(Y | ×`i=1 Z) minimizes the authentication
measure (to be discussed more later), given Grı´ma received z1, . . . , z` in the first through `-th rounds respectively.
Regardless of whether or not Grı´ma interlopes, he will observe z with probability q(z|x) given Alice transmitted x.
One final point, the DM-AIC(t, q) is not a true memoryless channel, as Grı´ma is not required to act in a memoryless
fashion; the “memoryless” part of the DM-AIC(t, q) only refers to the component channels t and q.
Now, over these j rounds of communication Alice wishes to send messages M1, . . . ,Mj to Bob, where each
message is independent and uniformly distributed on the set M = {1, . . . , 2nr}, with n ∈ Z+ and r ∈ R+. To
assist in communication, prior to the first round, Alice and Bob share a secret key, K, distributed uniformly over
K , {1, . . . , 2njκ}, where κ ∈ R+. For simplicity, we assume that 2nr ∈ Z+ and 2njκ ∈ Z+. To send these
messages, Alice uses an encoder that selects the channel input sequence X = ×ni=1Xi as a stochastic function of
the message M and key K. Throughout this paper, the encoder will be identified by the stochastic relationship
between message, key, and channel input sequence. More specifically, fi ∈ P(X |M,K) will be used to denote the
encoder used in the i-th round.
On the other end, Bob uses a decoder to estimate the message (or detect that Grı´ma interloped) as a function of
the received sequence from the DM-AIC(t, q) and the shared key. In the case that the decoder does declare that
Grı´ma interloped, it does so by producing the symbol “!” instead of a message. Similar to the encoder, the decoder
in the i-th will be identified by a conditional probability distribution ϕi ∈ P(M∪ {!}|Y ,K), where the ! symbol
is used by the decoder to signify that the message is false.
C. Operational Definitions
So far the following operational definitions have been introduced.
Quantity Name
j total rounds of communication
fi i-th round encoder
ϕi i-th round decoder
×ji=1(fi, ϕi) code
n block size
r message rate
κ key consumption rate
Before moving on to values not previously introduced, we would like to draw attention to a key difference in
how the message set and possible keys are specified. In particular, the size of the message set is determined by
the block size and message rate (M = {1, . . . , 2nr}), while the number of possible secret keys is determined by
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8the block size, key consumption rate, and the total number of rounds (K = {1, . . . , 2njκ}). This is done so that
both the key consumption rate and message rate are measures of resource per transmitted symbol. Indeed, a new
message is drawn from the message set for each round, while the same secret key must be used for all j-rounds
of communication.
Another important operational parameter of note is the authentication rate
α , min
i∈{1,...,j}
min
ψ∈P(Y|Zi)
−n−1 log2 E
[
ωfj ,ϕj ,i(Z
i,Mi,K)
]
,
where
ωfj ,ϕj ,i(z
i,m, k) ,
∑
y
ψ(y|zi)ϕi(M−{m} |y, k),
and for each zi,m, k the probability (Zi,Mi,K) = zi,m, k is
2−n(ir+jκ)
(∑
x∈X
q(zi|x)fi(x|m, k)
)
i−1∏
`=1
∑
x∈X
m∈M
q(z`|x)f`(x|m, k).
Note the quantity ωfj ,ϕj ,i(zi,m, k) is the probability of Grı´ma being successful in his attack given that he has
received zi, the message in the i-th round is m, and the secret key shared between Alice and Bob is k. As for the
authentication rate itself, it is once again a resource per transmitted symbol. That is, it is a measure of the exponent
of the worst case average probability of false authentication that is normalized by block length.
The final fundamental operational parameter is the probability of message error,
εfj ,ϕj , min
i∈{1,...,j}
εfi,ϕi
where
εf,ϕ , E [εf,ϕ(M,K)]
εf,ϕ(m, k) , 1−
∑
x,y
ϕ(m|y,k)t(y|x)f(x|m, k)
Unlike previous values, the probability of message error is not measured on a per transmitted symbol basis. Instead
the probability of message error is measured as the probability of error over a single round.
We can now put all of these operational parameters together, to define the operational measure of the code.
Definition 1. Code (f j , ϕj) is a (r, α, κ, , j, n)-average authentication (AA) code for DM-AIC(t, q) if it has block-
length n, message rate at least r, authentication rate at least α, key consumption rate at most κ, and probability
of message error less than .
With the measures of a code defined, for a fixed number of rounds j, we wish to know the maximum values of
the message rate (r), authentication rate (α), with the minimum key consumption rate (κ) for error probabilities
going to zero. Of course, probability of error being zero exactly restricts coding schemes too severely, hence, as
is tradition, the authentication capacity region is defined as a limit point of the operational measures as the block
length goes to infinity.
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9Definition 2. A triple (a, b, c) ∈ CAA(j)(t, q) if there exist a sequence of (ri, αi, κi, i, j, i)-AA codes, for DM-
AIC(t, q) such that
lim
i→∞
|(ri, αi, κi, i)− (a, b, c, 0)| = 0.
The set CAA(j)(t, q) is called the average authentication capacity region.
Remark This region is closed by definition.
III. PRIOR METHODS
For the reader’s convenience, we shall briefly describe the coding schemes of Lai et al. [1], Simmons [15], and
Gungor and Koksal [2]. While our coding scheme is novel in the sense that it has not previously appeared, it does
share a design philosophy with Lai et al. and with Simmons. These schemes separate in an intuitive way, with Lai
et al.’s scheme exploiting the channel for authenticity, and Simmon’s scheme exploiting only the secret key.
Our results recover those of Lai et al. [1], who only considered the problem with values of κ which asymptotically
vanish (i.e., the key consumption rate must go to zero). Our results also strictly improve on those of Gungor and
Koksal [2]. Although to demonstrate this, first we need to fix an error in their paper as discussed in Appendix D.
A. Lai’s Strategy
Lai et al. [1] used the strategy of Alice sending Bob the information about the secret key over the channel. The
idea behind this strategy is that when Bob decodes the transmission he will receive both the secret key and the
message, if the secret key matches his own then the message is authentic since no one else could know the key.
But, in order for this to be a viable strategy, the coding scheme has to ensure two properties. First, Grı´ma can
not be able to recover the secret key from his observations, since otherwise he could replace the message with
one of his own choosing. Second, the message and the secret key cannot be separately decoded (i.e. the set of
transmitted symbols can not be broken down into those corresponding to the secret key and those corresponding to
the transmission) since otherwise Grı´ma would only need to replace the part of the transmission related to sending
the message.
To accomplish both of these objectives, Lai et al. [1] used a modified wiretap coding scheme where, in particular,
they first chose an integer n and distribution ρ ∈ Pn(X ) such that
I(t, ρ)− I(q, ρ) > 0,
|M||K| < 2nI(t,ρ),
and |K| < 2n[I(t,ρ)−I(q,ρ)].
Next, they randomly and independently selected approximately 2nI(t,ρ) codewords from the type set of Tρ. These
codewords were then placed into one of 2n[I(t,ρ)−I(q,ρ)] bins at random, giving approximately 2nI(q,ρ) codewords
per bin. Each of these bins were then associated with a particular key, and each codeword in the bin was assigned a
message. Because the capacity of the channel from Alice to Grı´ma was entirely exhausted sending the information
about the message given the secret key, the secret key remained obscured from Grı´ma and yet still correlated with
the message.
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While we will use the same strategy as Lai (sending the secret key as a secure message) in the construction of
our coding scheme, we will not use their coding scheme. In situations other than when κ→ 0, their coding scheme
produces a poor trade off between the message rate, authentication rate, and key consumption rate. Instead we shall
use a general code for the discrete broadcast channel with confidential communications, (DM-BCCC) which we
describe in greater detail in Section III-D. Immediately this code can be seen as at least as good a coding scheme,
since it can recover theirs as a special case. Our scheme improves upon their scheme as well, since the detection
bounds remain unchanged except some channels now allow for message rates near maxρ∈P(X ) I(t, ρ) even when
I(t, ρ)− I(q, ρ) < 0 for the ρ which maximizes I(t, ρ).
B. Simmons’ strategy
Simmons [15] considered this problem where all links were noiseless. As such, you would expect Simmons’
strategy to not rely on a noisy channel. Simmons’ strategy, specifically, was to associate each key k ∈ {1, . . . , 2nκ}
with an independently and randomly chosen subset X (k) ⊂ X where
|X (k)| = 2−nκ/2|X | = |M|.
For each m ∈M and k, Alice chooses a unique x ∈ X (k) to represent the message. Hence, the message rate is
n−1 log2 |M| = n−1 log2
∣∣∣X˜ ∣∣∣− κ/2.
On the other hand, consider the scenario where Grı´ma observes x and replaces it with x′ 6= x. Having observed
x, Grı´ma can narrow down the value of the key (since not all X (k) contain x) and use this information in the
selection of x′. On average, there should be |K| (|X (k)| / |X |)2 = 1 value of k such that X (k) contain both x and
x′. At the same time there will be on average |K| (|X (k)| / |X |) = 2nκ/2 values of k such that X (k) contains x.
Hence, on average Grı´ma should only have a 2−nκ/2 chance of selecting a x′ which is actually valid for the given
secret key.
C. Gungor and Koksal’s strategy
Gungor and Koksal [2] established inner bounds for CAA(1)(t, q) by using a two secret key coding scheme, where
one of the secret keys is used via Lai’s strategy and the second is used to obfuscate the first key. In essence, one
can view their scheme as relating a unique code (whose input is the message and first key) to each value of the
second key. This helps to obfuscate the first values from Grı´ma since before decoding the message and first key
value, he needs to decode the second to determine which code is being used. On the other hand, Bob already has
the second key and therefore does not need to decode it.
There is, though, one major problem with this scheme. If the original key cannot already be made secret, it
implies that the channel to Grı´ma is superior. Using more bits of secret key to push the message to a point where
Grı´ma cannot decode is playing into his strength, and as a result, unnecessarily leaks bits of the keys. Instead, a
composition of Lai’s strategy and Simmons’ strategy will improve on this region. For the remainder of this section,
we derive the inner bound for CAA(1)(t, q) that can be obtained from [2] (with a correction to their paper found
here in Appendix D).
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In our paper’s language,4 [2, Theorem 1] shows that to every ρ ∈ P(Y|U), τ ∈ P(U), positive real numbers
κ1, κ2, and large enough n, there exists an (r, α, κ1 + κ2, , 1, n)-AA code where
 ≤ 2−n|I(tρ,τ)−r−κ1|++O(log2 n)
α = inf
ν∈P(Y|U)
D(ν||qρ|τ) + min(κ1, |r + κ1 + κ2 − I(ν, τ)|+)) +O(n−1 log2 n).
In turn, then, the subset of CAA(1)(t, q) that can be derived from their scheme is a subset of⋃
κ˜∈R+
RG(κ˜) (1)
where RG(κ˜) is the set of all non-negative triples (r, α, κ) such that
r + κ ≤ I(tρ, τ) + κ˜
α− κ ≤ −κ˜
α ≤ infν∈P(Y|U) D(ν||qρ|τ) + |κ˜+ I(tρ, τ)− I(ν, τ)|+ .
(2)
This follows by observing that all (r, α, κ) such that
r ≤ I(tρ, τ)− κ1 (3)
κ = κ1 + κ2 (4)
α ≤ κ1 (5)
α ≤ inf
ν∈P(Y|U)
D(ν||qρ|τ) + |r + κ1 + κ2 − I(ν, τ)|+ (6)
cause the upper bound on  to go to 0. Furthermore, (r, α, κ) ∈ RG(κ˜) for all (r, α, κ) that satisfy Equations (3)–(6)
which comes from replacing Equation (6) with the looser (due to Equation (3)) requirement that
α ≤ inf
ν∈P(Y|U)
D(ν||qρ|τ) + |κ2 + I(tρ, τ)− I(ν, τ)|+ ,
and then applying Fourier-Motzkin elimination to remove κ1.
D. Broadcast channel with confidential communications
Optimal codes for the discrete memoryless broadcast channel with confidential communications (DM-BCC(t, q))
channel were first presented and later improved by Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [17], [18, Chapter 17]. We describe what
appears in [18, Chapter 17]. In a DM-BCCC(t, q), Bob’s observation given Alice’s transmission, Y|X, is distributed
t(y|x), while Grı´ma’s observation give Alice’s transmission, Z|X, is distributed as q(z|x), just as they are in the
DM-AIC(t, q). In the DM-BCCC, though, Alice is attempting to send three messages. First, a message M0, where
M0 , {1, . . . , 2nr0}, which needs to be reliably decoded by both Bob and Grı´ma. Second, a message Ms, where
Ms , {1, . . . , 2nrs}, which needs to be reliably decoded by Bob, but kept secret from Grı´ma in the sense that
I(pZn|Ms , pMs) ≤ .
4Indeed this is because our declaration of intrusion, !, is equivalent to an erasure in [2]. Thus, εf,ϕ is less than the superposition of the
undetected and erasure bounds (with our correction) from [2]. Next, our measures only require consideration of substitution attacks, since the
probability of a successful impostor attack is always less than the probability of a successful substitution attack.
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Finally, a third message M1, where M1 , {1, . . . , 2nr1}, which only needs to be reliably decoded by Bob, and
has no secrecy constraint placed on Grı´ma’s observation.
For our coding scheme, we shall employ codes optimal for a DM-BCC(t, q) for use in a DM-AIC(t, q). Although
these codes are more general than those used by Lai et al., the way in which they will produce a positive measure
of authentication is the same. Namely, we shall send the secret key using the secure message. On the other hand,
by using M0 and M1 strategically, this coding scheme will allow for higher data rates to Bob by sacrificing the
leakage of inconsequential information to Grı´ma.
Consider this, by sending the secret key as the secure message, every received sequence at Bob can correspond
to at most one secret key. Thus, the maximum probability that Grı´ma is successful is equal to the probability of the
most likely key given his own observations. Now, one might suspect, then, that as long as the code could remain
strongly secure it would guarantee that the Grı´ma would gain negligible information about the key, and thus deliver
an authentication rate of jκ. After all, strong security by its definition is a measure of how close to the uniform
distribution Grı´ma’s key likelihoods are. Alas, this is not always the case, as there are rare outlier cases which
contribute negligible amounts to the leakage but dominate the authentication rate. Because of this, optimizing codes
around the authentication rate leads to different codes than optimizing around leakage.
IV. MAIN CONTRIBUTIONS
For our first major contribution, we employ Lai’s strategy with DM-BCCC codes to obtain the following inner
bound for CAA(j)(t, q).
Theorem 3. If non-negative real numbers (r, α, κ) satisfy
r + α ≤ I(tρ, στ)
α ≤ L(t, q|ρ, σ, τ)
α ≤ I(tρ, σ|τ)
α− jκ ≤ 0
, (7)
where
L(t, q|ρ, σ, τ) , min
ν∈P(Z|U)
F(ν||q, ρ|στ) + |S(tρ, ν|σ, τ)|+ ,
F(ν||q, ρ|σ) , min
ζ∈P(Z|X ,U):∑
x∈X ζ(z|x,u)ρ(x|u)=ν(z|u)
D(ζ||q|ρ× σ),
S(µ, ν|σ, τ) , I(µ, σ|τ)− I(ν, σ|τ) + |I(µσ, τ)− I(νσ, τ)|+ ,
for some ρ ∈ P(X|U), σ ∈ P(U  W), and τ ∈ P(W) with |U| and |W| finite, then (r, α, κ) ∈ CAA(j)(t, q).
The proof of Theorem 3 is contained in Appendix B. In order to prove the theorem, a unique code must be
created for each blocklength, but not for each round. The limit point of these operational parameters is then taken
to establish the theorem.
This result extends those of Lai et al. in [1] to the case where the key consumption rate is allowed to scale with
the blocklength. Specifically, the authentication rate can equal the key consumption rate as long as jκ is smaller
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than some threshold. When moving beyond that threshold, though, this scheme does not allow for further increases
in the authentication rate.
Another similar aspect to [1] is that number of communication rounds matters relatively little. In fact, the only
major impact that the number of rounds has on the rate region is allowing the key consumption rate to be smaller
and therefore more efficient. Intuitively, this makes sense, as the secret key is being kept secret during each round
of communication, and thus can be used in later rounds. This also implies the decrease in key consumption rate,
since the key consumption rate is normalized by the total number of symbols transmitted over each round.
Now, observe from Theorem 3 that the authentication rate and information rate share the channel’s finite resources.
Additionally, the authentication rate is dependent on the secrecy of the empirical channel. Indeed, observe the second
restriction which requires
α ≤ min
ν∈P(Z|U)
F(ν||q, ρ|στ) + |S(tρ, ν|σ, τ)|+ .
In this bound, the ν term can be understood as a communications channel between Alice and Grı´ma while tρ is
the equivalent channel between Alice and Bob. With this in mind, S(tρ, ν|σ, τ) is the amount of secret bits that tρ
provides when the empirical channel to Grı´ma is ν. On the other hand, F(ν||q, ρ|στ) is a penalty representing how
unlikely channel ν is to occur for Grı´ma given his actual channel is q and all code words are chosen according to a
distribution of ρ. Thus, the upper bound on the authentication rate is determined by the channel with the minimum
combination of penalty and secrecy.
While Theorem 3 makes explicit use of the channel to hide information, it is also possible (as shown by
Simmons [15]) to send authenticated information even when there does not exist an advantage in communication
channels. In fact, Simmons’ scheme (with a few modifications) is actually universally composable. Our next major
contribution is a result of this, since being universally composable allows for us to start with any code and apply
Simmons’ scheme to obtain a new message rate, authentication rate, key consumption rate trade off.
Theorem 4. If (r, α, κ) ∈ CAA(j)(t, q) then (r − β, α + β, κ + [1 + j−1]β) ∈ CAA(j)(t, q), for all non-negative
β < r.
The proof of Theorem 4 can be found in Appendix C.
The major difficulty in establishing Theorem 4 is that every round of communication requires a new encoder.
Using the same encoder every round would in essence allow for Grı´ma to effectively send previous rounds’ messages.
It is important to note, here, that the key consumption rate actually decreases with the total number of rounds. This
is because more and more key can be re-used throughout the transmissions, leading to an increase in efficiency.
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Now, from Theorem 3 and 4, it follows that all (r, α, κ) that satisfy
rˆ + αˆ ≤ I(tρ, στ)
αˆ ≤ L(t, q|ρ, σ, τ)
αˆ ≤ I(tρ, σ|τ)
αˆ ≤ jκˆ
r ≤ rˆ − β
α ≤ αˆ+ β
κ ≥ κˆ+ [1 + j−1]β
0 ≤ β
are contained in CAA(j)(t, q). Using Fourier-Motzkin elimination on the above region, specifically eliminating
rˆ, αˆ, κˆ, and β, proves the following theorem.
Theorem 5. If non-negative real numbers (r, α, κ) satisfy
r + α ≤ I(tρ, στ)
[1 + j−1]α− κ ≤ L(t, q|ρ, σ, τ)
[1 + j−1]α− κ ≤ I(tρ, σ|τ)
α− jκ ≤ 0 ,
(8)
for some distributions ρ ∈ P(X|U), σ ∈ P(U  W), and τ ∈ P(W), with |U| and |W| finite, then (r, α, κ) ∈
CAA(j)(t, q).
The second and third conditions of Theorem 5 are more easily understood as
α− j−1(jκ− α) ≤ min [L(t, q|ρ, σ, τ), I(tρ, σ|τ)] .
That is, unlike using Lai’s strategy alone, the authentication rate can exceed min [L(t, q|ρ, σ, τ), I(tρ, σ|τ)], but in
order to do so, the key consumption rate κ must be increased as well. In particular,
∆κ , κ− j−1 min [L(t, q|ρ, σ, τ), I(tρ, σ|τ)] ≥ j + 1
j
∆α,
for authentication rates α = ∆α + min [L(t, q|ρ, σ, τ), I(tρ, σ|τ)] and ∆α > 0. Just as with Simmons’ scheme, our
scheme is more efficient in key usage when the total number of rounds increases5; the minimum increase in key
consumption rate being ∆κ = ∆α.
It is easy to wonder if Theorem 5 also constitutes an outer bound. Unfortunately, the answer to this problem
is not so easy, since the metric essentially requires bounding information rates of more than two channels. That
is, the authentication rate will always be dominated by the channel which minimizes the combination of empirical
channel penalty and unleaked secret key information. Hence, when attempting a converse proof, the converse proof
must consider all channel simultaneously in absence of a result showing that a particular channel is the worst case
regardless of coding scheme.
5Although more rounds still requires a larger secret key, 2(j+1)n∆2nmin[L(t,q|ρ,σ,τ),I(tρ,σ|τ)] versus 2jn∆2nmin[L(t,q|ρ,σ,τ),I(tρ,σ|τ)]
bits of secret key for j versus j − 1 rounds.
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V. EXAMPLES
In order to demonstrate the trade-offs between the three parameters that make up the average authentication
capacity region and show the improvement over Gungor and Koksal’s region outer bound, we provide the following
examples for one round of authentication. For ease of understanding, we consider the case where both t and q are
binary symmetric channels (BSC). That is, if t is a BSC with parameter λt ∈ [0, 1/2], then X = Y = {0, 1} and
t(0|1) = t(1|0) = λt. Additionally, we restrict the distributions ζ, ν, ρ, σ, and τ in Eq. (8) to also be binary and
symmetric for purposes of computational simplicity. We hypothesize that the optimal distributions are in fact in
this form, but do not prove it here for sake of brevity. If this does not hold, the plots can simply be interpreted as
an additional inner bound to the average authentication capacity region for BSCs.
We provide three different annotated plots to illustrate different factors for the region. This includes the simple
message rate and authentication rate trade-off, the efficiency of consumed key material, and the effects of main
channel quality including both the less noisy and more noisy regimes. A second set of plots contains Gungor and
Koksal’s region outer bound for comparison with the previous three plots.
An important consequence of the inner bound of the capacity region in both (7) and (8) is that communication and
authentication must share the main channel capacity. This trade-off is depicted in Fig. 2 for both the less noisy and
more noisy channel cases. Thanks to the incorporation of Simmons’ noiseless strategy in our code, authentication
is still possible even when the main channel is more noisy (as opposed to Lai’s region (7)) albeit with a lower
maximum possible α. It can be seen that the more noisy case is limited by half the key κ/2 as dictated by Simmons’
strategy while the less noisy case is limited by the second condition in (8) which essentially represents the secrecy
capacity of the channel pair in combination with Simmons’. Having nonzero secrecy capacity clearly improves the
region.
Next, we examine the efficiency of the key in terms of bits of key consumption to bits of authentication rate in
different scenarios. When secrecy capacity is available, as much key as possible should be sent using the secrecy
provided by the channel since it is doubly as efficient as Simmons’ strategy. Fig. 3 demonstrates this effect. As
seen in the two less noisy cases, the initial gain in authentication is directly proportional to the amount of key used.
Once the secrecy capacity has been exhausted, however, the additional gain in authentication per key bit consumed
is halved since the less efficient Simmons’ scheme must be used. In the more noisy main channel case, the trade-off
is at a constant 1/2 for all key consumption rates since no secrecy capacity is available. In all cases, authentication
is ultimately limited by the main channel capacity and desired message rate.
Next, in Fig. 4, we show how the quality of the main channel directly affects the amount of authentication possible
for different key consumption rates. Naturally, as the main channel decreases in quality, lower authentication rates
are obtainable. For the cases of κ = .2 and κ = .1, the amount of secrecy capacity initially available exceeds the
amount of key material possessed. Thus, the channel can accommodate the entire key and α = κ until the channel
worsens since authentication is always limited by the size of the key. As we approach the nonzero secrecy capacity
point, the authentication rate tends towards half the key consumption rate κ/2 as previously explained. However, in
the cases of κ = .4 and κ = .3, by the time this happens, the main channel capacity cannot support both the desired
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Fig. 2. Message rate (r) vs. authentication rate (α) for both less noisy and more noisy main channel for the inner bound of the average
authentication capacity region (Eq. (8)).
Fig. 3. The amount of authentication rate gained per increase in key consumption rate is better when secrecy capacity is nonzero. Curves
obtained from inner bound of the average authentication capacity region (Eq. (8)).
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Fig. 4. Authentication capabilities decrease with worsening channel conditions. Curves obtained from inner bound of the average authentication
capacity region (Eq. (8)).
message rate of r = .25 and an authentication rate of κ/2, so α falls steeply. Eventually, all four cases converge
due to the falling main channel quality and the inability to sustain the desired message rate and authentication rate.
Finally, we compare our inner bound of the average authentication capacity region to the outer bound of Gungor
and Koksal’s scheme in Eq. (1). The following figures (5, 6, and 7) are the same as Figs. 2, 3, and 4, but now with
Gungor and Koksal’s outer bound included. The improvement is plainly seen in each case.
APPENDIX A
CODE CONSTRUCTION PRIMER
The proofs of error bounds will rely heavily on the method of types. Specifically, we will require the following
well known results (proofs of which can be found in [18, Chapter 2] or [19, Chapter 11]) for each (y,x) ∈ Y×X :
− 1
n
log2 t(y|x) = H(py|x|px) + D(py|x||t|px), (9)
− 1
n
log2 |Tµ(x)| = H(µ|px) +O(n−1 log2 n), (10)
− 1
n
log2 t(Tµ(x)|x) = D(µ||t|px) +O(n−1 log2 n), (11)
|Pn(Y,X )| = nO(1). (12)
All orders are determined solely by the cardinalities of support sets. Equation (12) will primarily be used to restrict
summations to a particular type without requiring upper or lower bounds. In particular,∑
x∈X
f(x) = nO(1) max
ν∈Pn(X )
∑
x∈Tν
f(x)
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Fig. 5. Message rate (r) vs. authentication rate (α) for both less noisy and more noisy main channel for the inner bound of the average
authentication capacity region (Eq. (8)) and Gungor and Koksal’s outer bound (Eq. (1)).
Fig. 6. The amount of authentication rate gained per increase in key consumption rate is better when secrecy capacity is nonzero. Curves
obtained from inner bound of the average authentication capacity region (Eq. (8)) and Gungor and Koksal’s outer bound (Eq. (1)).
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Fig. 7. Authentication capabilities decrease with worsening channel conditions. Curves obtained from inner bound of the average authentication
capacity region (Eq. (8)) and Gungor and Koksal’s outer bound (Eq. (1)).
for any function f : X → R+ since
max
ν∈Pn(X )
∑
x∈Tν
f(x) ≤
∑
x∈X
f(x) ≤
∑
ν∈Pn(X )
max
ν∈Pn(X)
∑
x∈Tν
f(x).
In addition to these well known properties, we will need to develop a few lemmas, which extend the above concepts
to more general cases.
The first of these lemmas will allow for us to chain together type class inclusions. This will help streamline
analysis since, in general6, z /∈ Tνσ(w) when z ∈ Tν(u) and u ∈ Tσ(w).
Lemma 6. Let ν ∈ P(Z|U), σ ∈ P(U  W) and τ ∈ P(W). If z ∈ Tν(u) and u ∈ Tσ(w), then z ∈ Tνσ(w).
Proof: First, note that
ν(c|b) = pz|u(c|b) =
∑
a
pz|u,w(c|b, a)pw|u(a|b) = pz|u,w(c|b, ab),
where ab is the value such that pu|w(b|ab) = σ(b|ab) is non-zero. Hence,
pz|w(c|a) =
∑
b
pz|u,w(c|b, a)pu|w(b|a)
=
∑
b:ab=b
pz|u,w(c|b, a)σ(b|a) +
∑
b:ab 6=b
pz|u,w(c|b, a)σ(b|a)
6Indeed, consider the case where w = (0, 0, 1, 1), u = (1, 0, 1, 0) and z = (0, 0, 1, 1). Clearly pz|w 6= pz|upu|w .
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=
∑
b:ab=b
ν(c|b)σ(b|a)
= νσ(c|a).
Corollary 7. Furthermore
{u˜ : z ∈ Tµ(u˜), u˜ ∈ Tσ(w)} = Tµ¯(z,w),
where µ¯ ∈ Pn(Z|U ,W) and more specifically µ¯× µσ = µ× σ.
Proof: We will complete the corollary in two steps, first showing U∗ , {u˜ : z ∈ Tµ(u˜), u˜ ∈ Tσ(w)} ⊆
Tµ¯(z,w), and then Tµ¯(z,w) ⊆ U∗.
To show U∗ ⊆ Tµ¯(z,w), we need that pu˜|z,w = µ¯ for all u˜ ∈ U∗. Towards this goal, for any u˜ ∈ U∗, consider
the following two expansions of pz,u˜|w. First,
pz,u˜|w = pu˜|z,w × pz|w = pu˜|z,w × µσ
since z ∈ Tµ(u) and u ∈ Tσ(w) implies z ∈ Tµσ(w) by Lemma 6. Second,
pz,u˜|w = pz|u˜,w × pu˜|w = pz|u˜ × pu˜|w = µ× σ
since u˜ determines w. Solving for pu˜|z,w shows that µ¯× µσ = µ× σ.
Next, to show Tµ¯(z,w) ⊆ U∗, we need to show that u˜ ∈ Tµ¯(z,w) implies that pu˜|w = σ and pz|u˜ = µ. To this
end, for all u˜ ∈ Tµ¯(z,w), it must follow that
pu˜|w = pu˜|z,wpz|w =
∑
z
µ¯(u|z, w)µσ(z|w) =
∑
z
µ(z|u)σ(u|w) = σ.
Note that this also proves that u˜ ∈ Tµ¯(z,w) for at most one w, hence
pz|u˜ × σ = pz|u˜,w × σ = pz|u˜,w × pu˜|w = pu˜,z|w = pu˜|z,w × pz|w = µ¯× µσ = µ× σ.
The next lemma is needed because we will be using stochastic encoders which select an element at random from
a type class, instead of selecting symbols independently for each of the n channel inputs. This will allow us to
only penalize when the channel is bad since non-typical outputs from the stochastic encoder are eliminated.
Lemma 8. Given finite sets U , Y and X :
− 1
n
log2
 ∑
x∈Tq(u)
|Tq(u)|−1t(y|x)
 = H(py|u|pu) + Fn(py|u||t, q|pu) +O(n−1 log2 n), (13)
for each y ∈ Y , u ∈ U , and q ∈ Pn(X|U ; pu).
Proof:
First observe the following:∑
x∈Tq(u)
|Tq(u)|−1t(y|x)
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=
∑
pY,U,X∈Pn(Y,U,X ):
pY |U=py|u,
pX|U=q,
pU=pu
∑
x∈TX|U,Y (u,y)
|Tq(u)|−1t(y|x) (14)
=
∑
pY,U,X∈Pn(Y,U,X ):
pY |U=py|u,
pX|U=q,
pU=pu
∑
x∈TX|U,Y (u,y)
2−n[H(q|pu)+H(pY |X |pX)+D(pY |X ||t|pX)]+O(log2 n) (15)
=
∑
pY,U,X∈Pn(Y,U,X ):
pY |U=py|u,
pX|U=q,
pU=pu
2−n[−H(pX|U,Y |pU,Y )+H(pX|U |pU )+H(pY |X |pX)+D(pY |X ||t|pX)]+O(log2 n) (16)
= max
pY,U,X∈Pn(Y,U,X ):
pY |U=py|u,
pX|U=q,
pU=pu
2−n[−H(pX|U,Y |pU,Y )+H(pX|U |pU )+H(pY |X |pX)+D(pY |X ||t|pX)]+O(log2 n); (17)
where (14) is because Tq(u) = ∪pY,U,X∈Pn(Y,U,X ):
pY |U=py|u,
pX|U=q,
pU=pu
TpX|U,Y (u,y) and type classes have no intersection; (15) is
because of Equations (9) and (10); (16) is by Equation (10) and because the summands do not depend on the value
of x; and (17) is by Equation (17).
The lemma result now follows since
−H(pX|U,Y |pU,Y ) +H(pX|U |pU ) +H(pY |X |pX)
= H(pY |U |pU ) + I(pY |U,X , pU |X |pX), (18)
and
min
pY,U,X∈Pn(Y,U,X ):
pY |U=py|u,
pX|U=q,
pU=pu
I(pY |U,X , pU |X |pX) + D(pY |X ||t|pX)
= min
pY,U,X∈Pn(Y,U,X ):
pY |U=py|u,
pX|U=q,
pU=pu
∑
y∈Y,
x∈X ,
u∈U
pY,X,U (y, x, u) log2
pY,X|U (y, x|u)
pX|U (x|u)t(y|x) (19)
= min
ζ∈Pn(Y|X ,U ;q×pu):
ζq=py|u
∑
y∈Y,
x∈X ,
u∈U
ζ(y|x, u)q(x|u)pu(u) log2
ζ(y|x, u)
t(y|x) (20)
= Fn(py|u||t, q|pu). (21)
Type class arguments are especially useful for code construction since elements over a type class are generally
equiprobable, thus allowing for analysis by basic counting arguments. Here is no different, we will want to know
the probability of choosing at random a value of the type class that is typical with a particular observation. The
following lemma is in this spirit, and is, in fact, a minor result from Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [18, Lemma 10.1].
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Lemma 9. [18, Minor result from Lemma 10.1] Let σ ∈ Pn(U  W) and τ ∈ Pn(W). If U is uniformly
distributed over Tσ(w) then
− 1
n
log2 Pr (y ∈ Tµ(U)) = I(µ, σ|τ) +O(log2 n)
for all y ∈ Tµσ(w) and w ∈ Tτ .
Proof: If U is chosen uniformly over Tσ(w), then
Pr (y ∈ Tµ(U)) =
∑
u
pU(u)1{y ∈ Tµ(u)} = |{u : y ∈ Tµ(u), u ∈ Tσ(w)}||Tσ(w)| (22)
for all y ∈ Tµσ(w). But, {u : y ∈ Tµ(u), u ∈ Tσ(w)} = Tµ¯(y,w), where µ¯ ∈ Pn(Y|U ,W) is such that µ¯×µσ =
µ× σ, by Corollary 7. Hence,
− 1
n
log2 Pr (y ∈ Tµ(U)) = H(σ|τ)−H(µ¯|µσ × τ) +O(n−1 log2 n) (23)
by (10). The final result now follows since
H(σ|τ)−H(µ¯|µσ × τ)
= −
∑
c∈Y,
b∈U,
a∈W
µ(c|b)σ(b|a)τ(a) log2 σ(b|a) +
∑
c∈Y,
b∈U,
a∈W
µ¯(b|a, c)µσ(c|a)τ(a) log2 µ¯(b|a, c)
= −
∑
c∈Y,
b∈U,
a∈W
µ(c|b)σ(b|a)τ(a) log2 σ(b|a) +
∑
c∈Y,
b∈U,
a∈W
µ(c|b)σ(b|a)τ(a) log2
µ(c|b)σ(b|a)
µσ(c|a)
=
∑
c∈Y,
b∈U,
a∈W
µ(c|b)σ(b|a)τ(a) log2
µ(c|b)
µσ(c|a)
= I(µ, σ|τ).
While Lemma 9 determines the probability of randomly selecting a single value of u which will be typical
with y, it will also be necessary to consider the probabilities of selecting multiple values of u where at least one
is typical for each in a sequence of observations. Such a result will be necessary to look at the probabilities of
codewords after multiple observations by an adversary.
Lemma 10. Fix τ ∈ Pn(W) and σ ∈ Pn(U  W), and let Mi be a finite set such that |Mi| ≥ 8j ln j for each
i ∈ {1, . . . , j}, and suppose wm ∈ Tτ for each m ∈ ∪ji=1Mi. Given independent RVs Um uniformly distributed
over Tσ(wm) for each m ∈ ∪ji=1Mi, then
log2 Pr
(
j⋂
i=1
{
zi ∈
⋃
m∈Mi
Tνi(Um)
})
≥
j∑
i=1
|log2(|Mi|)− nI(νi, σ|τ)|− +O(j log2 nj) (24)
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for all×ji=1 νi ∈×ji=1 Pn(Z|U ;στ), and×ji=1 zi ∈×ji=1Z such that zi ∈ ⋂m∈Mi Tνiσ(wm) for each i ∈
{1, . . . , j}.
Proof:
The major obstacle in proving the lemma is that events zi ∈
⋃
m∈Mi Tνi(Um) and zj ∈
⋃
m∈Mj Tνj (Um) are
correlated7. If there exists sets (which shall be constructed later) M∗i ⊆ Mi, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , j}, such that
|M∗i | ≥ (2j)−1|Mi| and M∗i ∩M∗j = ∅ for i 6= j, then the lemma can be obtained as follows:
Pr
(
j⋂
i=1
{
zi ∈
⋃
m∈Mi
Tνi(Um)
})
≥ Pr
 j⋂
i=1
zi ∈ ⋃
m∈M∗i
Tνi(Um)

 (25)
=
j∏
i=1
1− ∏
m∈M∗i
Pr (zi /∈ Tνi(Um))
 (26)
=
j∏
i=1
[
1−
(
1− 2−nI(νi,σ|τ)+O(log2 n)
)|M∗i |]
(27)
≥
j∏
i=1
[
1− exp
(
−|M∗i |2−nI(νi,σ|τ)+O(log2 n)
)]
(28)
≥ 2
∑j
i=1|log2(|M∗i |)−nI(νi,σ|τ)|−+O(j log2 n) (29)
≥ 2
∑j
i=1|log2(|Mi|)−nI(νi,σ|τ)|−+O(j log2 nj) (30)
where (26) is because M∗i ∩M∗j = ∅ for i 6= j and hence the events are independent; (27) is by Lemma 9; (28)
is because8 (1− a)b ≤ e−ab for a ∈ [0, 1] and b > 0; (29) is because 1− e−x ≥ 2| log2 x|−−1; and (30) is because
|M∗i | ≥ (2j)−1|Mi|.
The existence of the aforementioned sets M∗i , for each i ∈ {1, . . . , j}, is guaranteed by the following random
coding argument. For each m ∈ ⋃ji=1Mi, let I(m) , {i ∈ {1, . . . , j} : m ∈Mi} and let Im be independent RVs
uniform over I(m). Now let
M∗i , {m ∈Mi : Im = i} (31)
for each i ∈ {1, . . . , j}, and observe that
Pr
(
j⋂
i=1
{ ∑
m∈Mi
1{Im = i} ≥ (2j)−1|Mi|
})
≥ 1−
j∑
i=1
Pr
( ∑
m∈Mi
1{Im = i} < (2j)−1|Mi|
)
(32)
≥ 1−
j∑
i=1
exp
(
−
(
1
2
ln
e
2
)
j|Mi|
)
(33)
> 1− min
i∈{1,...,j}
exp
(
−|Mi|
8j
+ ln j
)
≥ 0 (34)
7Indeed, for instance if zi = zj , νi = νj , and Mi = Mj , then clearly 1{zi ∈
⋃
m∈Mi Tνi (Um)} = 1 if and only if 1{zj ∈⋃
m∈Mj Tνj (Um)} = 1.
8See [19, Lemma 10.5.3].
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where (32) is the union bound; (33) is by the (upcoming) Lemma 11 and because 1{Im = i} is Bernoulli(b) with
b ≥ 1j ; and (34) is because |Mi| ≥ 8j ln j for all i ∈ {1, . . . , j}. But
Pr
(
j⋂
i=1
{ ∑
m∈Mi
1{Im = i} ≥ (2j)−1|Mi|
})
> 0 (35)
implies there must exist at least one selection of set of outcomes for Im which leads to orthogonal M∗i such that
|M∗i | ≥ (2j)−1|Mi| for all i ∈ {1, . . . , j}.
The next lemma appears in [18, Lemma 17.9].
Lemma 11. ([18, Lemma 17.9]) The probability that in k independent trials an event of probability q occurs
less/more than αqk times, according as α ≶ 1, is bounded above by e−c(α)qk where c(α) = α lnα− α+ 1.
In determining the number of sequences of u chosen such that z ∈ Tν(u), each independent selection of a
sequence can be viewed as a trial. Lemma 11 can be applied effectively, regardless of if qk ≶ 1. Although, the
method by which it should be applied differs. To streamline the analysis, the following corollary of Lemma 11 will
be used instead.
Corollary 12. For all real numbers a ≥ 1n and b ≥ 0
Pr
(b2nac×
i=1
Vi ∈ Vˆ(ne)2
)
≥ 1− 2e−n2/4 (36)
where
Vˆγ ,

b2nac×
i=1
vi :
⌊
1
γ
2−n|a−b|
+
⌋
<
b2nac∑
i=1
vi ≤ γ2−n|a−b|+

and×b2naci=1 Vi are independent Bernoulli (2−nb) random variables. Furthermore, if n(a− b) > 1 + 2 log2 n then
Pr
(b2nac×
i=1
Vi ∈ Vˆ2e
)
≥ 1− 2e−n2/4. (37)
Proof: Throughout this proof we will use that
2na−1 ≤ 2na − 1 ≤ b2nac ≤ 2na,
which follows because a ≥ 1n .
If n(a− b) ≥ 1 + 2 log2 n, then
Pr
b2nac∑
i=1
Vi <
⌊
(2e)−12n|a−b|
+
⌋ ≤ Pr
b2nac∑
i=1
Vi < e
−1b2nac2−nb

< e−(1−2e
−1)2n(a−b)−1 < e−n
2/4 (38)
and
Pr
b2nac∑
i=1
Vi > (2e)2
n|a−b|+
 ≤ Pr
b2nac∑
i=1
Vi > eb2nac2−nb
 < e−2n(a−b)−1 < e−n2 (39)
by Lemma 11.
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On the other hand, if n(a− b) < 1 + 2 log2 n, then
Pr
b2nac∑
i=1
Vi <
⌊
(en)−22n|a−b|
+
⌋ = Pr
b2nac∑
i=1
Vi < 0
 = 0 (40)
and
Pr
b2nac∑
i=1
Vi > (ne)
22n|a−b|
+
 ≤ Pr(∑
i
Vi > (ne)
2
)
= Pr
(∑
i
Vi >
(
(ne)2
b2nac2−nb
)
b2nac2−nb
)
< e−n
2/4 (41)
by Lemma 11, where in particular
c
(
(ne)2
d
)
d = (ne)2 ln
(ne)2
d
− (ne)2 + d
> (ne)2 ln
e2
2
− (ne)2
= (ne)2(1− ln(2)) > n2/4
for all real numbers d < 2n2.
We conclude with a technical proof, which will help to simplify presentation.
Lemma 13. Let A1, . . . ,Ak be subsets of some finite set X .
kminj∈{1,...,k} |Aj |
maxx∈∪iAi |{i : x ∈ Ai}|
≤ |∪iAi| <
kmaxj∈{1,...,k} |Aj |
minx∈∪iAi |{i : x ∈ Ai}|
.
Proof:
Note that
|∪iAi| =
∑
x∈X
1{x ∈ ∪iAi}. (42)
From this equation, it must also follow that
∣∣∪ki=1Ai∣∣ = ∑
x∈X
k∑
i=1
1{x ∈ Ai}
|{i : x ∈ Ai}| (43)
since
1{x ∈ ∪ki=1Ai} =
k∑
i=1
1{x ∈ Ai}
|{i : x ∈ Ai}|
for every x ∈ ∪ki=1Ai. Swapping the order of the summations and replacing the denominator and numerator with
the min or max proves the lemma.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Appendices B-A through B-C are dedicated to proving the following theorem:
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Theorem 14. Given finite sets U and W , distributions ρ ∈ Pn(X|U ;στ), σ ∈ Pn(U  W), and τ ∈ Pn(W) there
exists a
(r, α, κ, , j, n)−AA code for DM−AIC(t, q),
where
−n−1 log2  ≥ min
µ∈Pn(Y|U ;στ)
Fn(µ||t, ρ|στ)− |jκ+ Srˆ,r˜(µ|σ, τ)|− +O(n−1 log2 n),
α ≥ min
νj∈×ji=1 Pn(Z|U ;στ)
∣∣∣∣∣jκ+
j∑
i=1
|Srˆ,r˜(νi|σ, τ)|−
∣∣∣∣∣
+
+
j∑
i=1
Fn(νi||q, ρ|στ) +O(jn−1 log2 n),
for all r ≤ r˜ + rˆ, κ ≥ κ˜, and large enough n.
Theorem 14 will be proved by using a random code construction presented in Appendix B-A. For each round
of communication, the same code shall be used. Next, the message error probability (i.e., the bound on ) is then
derived in Appendix B-B and the authentication rate (i.e., the bound on α) in B-C. The error probability does not
change with the number of rounds, since the code is fixed over all rounds. On the other hand, the authentication rate
should decrease as the number of rounds increases due to the fact that the adversary continues to gain information.
Because of this, we only need to consider the final round (j) of communication when analyzing the authentication
rate.
Afterwards, using Theorem 14, we prove Theorem 3 in Appendix B-D. A proof for Theorem 3 is still necessary
in light of Theorem 14 since Theorem 14 does not concern itself with asymptotic behaviour, whereas the capacity
region is defined as the limit point of a sequence of codes.
Proof:
A. Code construction
The code construction involves rate splitting, where the message setM , {1, . . . , 2nr} is split into the product of
sets M˜ , {1, . . . , 2nr˜} and Mˆ , {1, . . . , 2nrˆ}, such that r˜+ rˆ = r. The set of keys is denoted K = {1, . . . , 2njκ},
where the same key is being used for all j rounds of communication. Furthermore, the same code will be used in
every round (i.e., f1 = f2 = · · · = fj and ϕ1 = ϕ2 = · · · = ϕj) and thus we shall simply refer to this code as
f, ϕ.
Random codebook generation: Independently for each mˆ ∈ Mˆ, select wf (mˆ) uniformly from Tτ . Then,
independently for each (mˆ, m˜, k) ∈ Mˆ × M˜ × K, select the value of uf (mˆ, m˜, k) uniformly from Tσ(wf (mˆ)).
Encoder: For (Mˆ, M˜ ,K) = (mˆ, m˜, k) the encoder chooses X uniformly from Tρ(u(mˆ, m˜, k)); i.e.,
f(x|mˆ, m˜, k) ,
|Tρ(uf (mˆ, m˜, k))|
−1 if x ∈ Tρ(uf (mˆ, m˜, k))
0 else
. (44)
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Decoder: For received sequence Y = y and key K = k, the decoder ϕ chooses the message estimates according
to the distribution
ϕ(mˆ′, m˜′|y, k) ,

1 if
∑
x∈Tρ(uf (mˆ′,m˜′,k)) t(y|x) >
∑
x˜∈Tρ(uf (i,j,l)) t(y|x˜)
∀(i, j, l) ∈ Mˆ × M˜ × K − {(mˆ′, m˜′, k)}
0 otherwise
, (45)
for all (mˆ′, m˜′) ∈ Mˆ × M˜, and instead declares intrusion according to
ϕ(!|y, k) ,
1 if
∑
(mˆ,m˜)∈Mˆ×M˜ ϕf (mˆ
′, m˜′|y, k) = 0
0 otherwise
. (46)
That is, for a given y, Bob declares (mˆ′, m˜′) to be the message sent if (mˆ′, m˜′, k) is the unique maximizer of∑
x∈Tρ(uf (mˆ′,m˜′,k)) t(y|x), and declares ! if the maximizer is not unique.
B. Message error analysis
Let F,Φ be the random variables that represent the randomly chosen encoder and decoder. By extension, wF (mˆ)
and uF (mˆ, m˜, k) denote the RVs representing the randomly chosen wf (mˆ) and uf (mˆ, m˜, k). To prove the error
bound in Theorem 14, it is sufficient to show that
E[εF,Φ] ≤ max
µ∈Pn(Y|U ;στ)
2−n(Fn(µ||t,ρ|στ)−|Srˆ,r˜(µ|σ,τ)+jκ|
−)+O(log2 n). (47)
Indeed,
Pr (εF,Φ ≥ nE[εF,Φ]) ≤ n−1 (48)
directly follows from Equation (47) by Markov’s inequality, hence proving that as n increases, the probability of
a code constructed according to Appendix B-A satisfying
−n−1 log2 εf,ϕ ≥ Fn(µ||t, ρ|στ)− |Srˆ,r˜(µ|σ, τ) + jκ|− +O(n−1 log2 n)
converges to one.
For the first step in proving Equation (47), it will be helpful to express εf,ϕ in terms of indicator functions
determining when a code is in error. To do this, for each µ ∈ Pn(Y|U ;στ), u ∈ Tστ and y ∈ Tµ(u) let
D(µ) ,
µ′ ∈ Pn(Y|U ;στ) : H(µ|στ) + Fn(µ||t, ρ|στ)≥ H(µ′|στ) + Fn(µ′||t, ρ|στ) +O(n−1 log2 n)
 ,
E(u,y) ,
uˆ ∈ Tστ : y ∈ ⋃
µ′∈D(py|u)
Tµ′(uˆ)

where the order term is inherited from Lemma 8 so that uˆ ∈ E(u,y) implies∑
x∈Tρ(u)
t(y|x) ≤
∑
x∈Tρ(uˆ)
t(y|x).
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With these definitions, the function
λf,ϕ(mˆ, m˜, k,u,y) , 1
uf (mˆ, m˜, k) = u
1
 ⋃
(i1,i2,i3)∈Mˆ×M˜×K−(mˆ,m˜,k)
uf (i1, i2, i3) ∈ E(u,y)

is only non-zero if both uf (mˆ, m˜, k) = u and there exists a value of (i1, i2, i3) 6= (mˆ, m˜, k) such that uf (i1, i2, i3) ∈
E(u,y). The probability of error can now be written as
εf,ϕ =
∑
mˆ∈Mˆ,
m˜∈M˜,
k∈K,
y∈Y,
u∈Tστ
λf,ϕ(mˆ, m˜, k,u,y)2
−n(rˆ+r˜+jκ) ∑
x∈Tρ(u)
|Tρ(u)|−1t(y|x). (49)
Or, as
εf,ϕ =
∑
µ∈Pn(Y|U ;στ)
mˆ∈Mˆ,
m˜∈M˜,
k∈K,
u∈Tστ
∑
y∈Tµ(u)
λf,ϕ(mˆ, m˜, k,u,y)2
−n(rˆ+r˜+jκ+Fn(µ||t,ρ|στ)+H(µ|στ))+O(log2 n) (50)
by splitting the summation of y depending on the empirical distribution py|u and using Lemma 8.
Next, assume that
E [λF,Φ(mˆ, m˜, k,u,y)] ≤ 2−nH(στ)+O(log2 n)2n|r˜+jκ+max(rˆ−I(µ
†,στ),−I(µ∗,στ))|− , (51)
where
µ† = argmax
γ∈D(µ):γστ=µστ
H(γ|στ) (52)
and µ∗ = argmax
γ∈D(µ):γσ=µσ
H(γ|στ), (53)
for each µ ∈ Pn(Y|U ;στ), mˆ ∈ Mˆ, m˜ ∈ M˜, k ∈ K, u ∈ Tστ , and y ∈ Tµ(u). Later, Equation (51) will be
justified. For now, though, under the assumption that Equation (51) is true,
E[εF,Φ] =
∑
µ∈Pn(Y|U ;στ)
mˆ∈Mˆ,
m˜∈M˜,
k∈K,
u∈Tστ
∑
y∈Tµ(u)
2−n(rˆ+r˜+jκ+Fn(µ||t,ρ|στ)+H(µ|στ))+O(log2 n)E [λF,Φ(mˆ, m˜, k,u,y)] (54)
≤ max
µ∈Pn(Y|U ;στ)
2−nFn(µ||t,ρ|στ)+O(log2 n)2n|r˜+jκ+max(rˆ−I(µ†,στ),−I(µ∗,σ|τ))|− (55)
follows from (50) by using the linearity of the expected value and carrying out the summations using Equation (10)
and (12) when applicable. To obtain Equation (47), observe for all µ ∈ Pn(Y|U ,X ;στ) and µ‡ ∈ {µ∗, µ†} that
−Fn(µ‡||t, ρ|στ) +O(n−1 log2 n) ≥ −Fn(µ||t, ρ|στ)−H(µ|στ) +H(µ‡|στ) ≥ −Fn(µ||t, ρ|στ)
since µ‡ ∈ D(µ) and H(µ‡|στ) ≥ H(µ|στ). Hence,
E[εF,Φ] ≤ max
µ∈Pn(Y|U ;στ)
2
n
(
−Fn(µ†||t,ρ|στ)+|rˆ+r˜+jκ−I(µ†,στ)|−
)
+O(log2 n) if rˆ − I(µ†, στ) > −I(µ∗, σ|τ)
2n(−Fn(µ
∗||t,ρ|στ)+|r˜+jκ−I(µ∗,σ|τ)|−)+O(log2 n) else
(56)
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≤ max
µ∈Pn(Y|U ;στ)
2n(−Fn(µ||t,ρ|στ)+|jκ+Srˆ,r˜(µ|σ,τ)|
−)+O(log2 n), (57)
proving Equation (47).
Now, we return to proving Equation (51), which can be done by upper bounding λF,Φ(mˆ, m˜, k,u,y) in two
ways. The first upper bound can be constructed directly as follows
E [λF,Φ(mˆ, m˜, k,u,y)] ≤ E [1 {uF (mˆ, m˜, k) = u}] (58)
= Pr (uF (mˆ, m˜, k) = u) (59)
= 2−nH(στ)+O(log2 n); (60)
where (58) is because λf,ϕ(mˆ, m˜, k,u,y) ≤ 1{uf (mˆ, m˜, k) = u} for all codes; (59) is because the expectation
of an indicator is the probability of that indicator; and (60) is by Equation (11) since uF is uniformly distributed
over Tστ . For the second upper bound, observe that
E [λF,Φ(mˆ, m˜, k,u,y)] ≤
∑
(i1,i2,i3)∈Mˆ×M˜×K−{(mˆ,m˜,k)}
E [1{uF (mˆ, m˜, k) = u}1{uF (i1, i2, i3) ∈ E(u,y)}] (61)
=
∑
(i1,i2,i3)∈Mˆ×M˜×K−{(mˆ,m˜,k)}
Pr (uF (mˆ, m˜, k) = u,uF (i1, i2, i3) ∈ E(u,y)) , (62)
since the expectation of an event indicator is the probability of the event. The value of Pr(uF (mˆ, m˜, k) =
u,uF (i1, i2, i3) ∈ E(u,y)) depends on if mˆ = i. If mˆ 6= i, then uF (mˆ, m˜, k) and uF (i1, i2, i3) are independently
and uniformly chosen over Tστ , and thus
Pr(uF (mˆ, m˜, k) = u,uF (i, j, l) ∈ E(u,y))
= |Tστ |−1
∑
µ′∈D(py|u):
µ′στ=py|uστ
Pr(y ∈ Tµ′(uF )) (63)
= 2−nH(στ)+O(log2 n)
∑
µ′∈D(py|u):
µ′στ=py|uστ
2−nI(µ
′,στ) (64)
= 2−n(H(στ)+I(µ
†,στ))+O(log2 n); (65)
where (63) is because
µ′στ = py|u′pu′ = py = py|upu = py|uστ
for each u′ ∈ Tστ and y ∈ Tµ′(u′); (64) is by Equation (10) and Lemma 9; and (65) is by Equation (12) and
because
min
µ′∈D(py|u):
µ′στ=py|uστ
I(µ′, στ) = H(µστ)− max
µ′∈D(py|u):
µ′στ=py|uστ
H(µ′|στ) = I(µ†, στ).
Otherwise, if mˆ = i1, then uF (mˆ, m˜, k) and uF (mˆ, i2, i3) are independently chosen from Tσ(w) for some w ∈ Tτ ,
and furthermore, this value of w can be determined by the value of uf (mˆ, m˜, k) since σ ∈ P(U  W). Thus,
when mˆ = i, a similar analysis to before shows that
Pr(uF (mˆ, m˜, k) = u,uF (i1, i2, i3) ∈ E(u,y)) = 2−n(H(στ)+I(µ∗,σ|τ))+O(log2 n). (66)
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Plugging (65) and (66) into (62) and carrying out the summations yields
E [λF,Φ(mˆ, m˜, k,u,y)] ≤
∑
i1∈Mˆ−{mˆ},
(i2,i3)∈M˜×K
2−n(H(στ)+I(µ
†,στ))+O(log2 n)
+
∑
(i2,i3)∈M˜×K−{(m˜,k)}
2−n(H(στ)+I(µ
∗,σ|τ))+O(log2 n) (67)
= 2−nH(στ)+n(r˜+jκ+max(rˆ−I(µ
†,στ),−I(µ∗,σ|τ)))+O(log2 n). (68)
Combining Equations (60) and (68) validates Equation (51).
C. Authentication rate analysis
The proof of the authentication rate of Theorem 14 follows first by proving that
−n−1 log2 ωfj ,ϕj ,j ≥ min
νj∈×ji=1 Pn(Z|U ;στ)
∣∣∣∣∣jκ+
j∑
i=1
|Srˆ,r˜(νi|σ, τ)|−
∣∣∣∣∣
+
+
j∑
i=1
Fn(νi||q, ρ|στ)+O(jn−1 log2 n) (69)
for all codes (chosen according to Appendix B-A) (f, ϕ) such that f ∈ F∗ ∩F†, where F∗ is the set of all f such
that
n−1 log2
∣∣M¯f (z, ν, k)∣∣ = |Srˆ,r˜(ν|σ, τ)|+ +O(n−1 log2 n), (70)
M¯f (z, ν, k) , {(mˆ, m˜) ∈ Mˆ × M˜ : z ∈ Tν(uf (mˆ, m˜, k))}
for all ν ∈ Pn(Z|U ;στ) and z ∈ Zf (ν, k) ,
⋃
mˆ∈Mˆ,
m˜∈M˜
Tν(uf (mˆ, m˜, k)), and F† is the set of all f such that
n−1 log2
∣∣Kf (zj , νj)∣∣ ≥
∣∣∣∣∣jκ+
j∑
i=1
|Srˆ,r˜(νi|σ, τ)|−
∣∣∣∣∣
+
+O(n−1 log2 n), (71)
Kf (zj , νj) ,
{
k ∈ K : ∩ji=1{zi ∈ Zf (νi, k)]}
}
, (72)
for all νj ∈×ji=1 Pn(Z|U ;στ) and zj ∈×ji=1Zf (νi, k). Having shown f ∈ F∗ ∩ F† imply (69), for the second
part of the proof, it is shown that
Pr
(
F ∈ F∗ ∩ F†) ≥ 1− e−n2/4+O(n). (73)
Hence for large enough n, the code construction of Appendix B-A produces a code in F∗ ∩F†, and therefore (69)
holds.
These two goals have been subdivided into their own subsections for simplicity.
1) Authentication rate for f ∈ F†∩F∗: For this section, it will be assumed that the code satisfies (70) and (71).
The bound presented in Theorem 14 can be obtained through direct manipulation, but first, two observations will
prove helpful.
The first observation is that for any deterministic decoder (i.e., the range of φ is {0, 1}), the type I error can be
simplified to
ωf,ϕ,j =
∑
zj∈Zj
max
k∈K
p(zj , k). (74)
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Indeed, clearly setting ψ(y|zj) = 1{g(zj) = y}, where g : Zj → Y is any deterministic function for which∑
k
p(zj , k)ϕ(M|g(zj), k) = max
y∈Y
∑
k∈K
p(zj , k)ϕ(M|y, k)
for all zj , maximizes the type I error. Thus, Equation (74) since ϕ(M|y, k) = 1 for at most one k in the code
construction.
The second observation is that
− 1
n
log2
∑
zj∈Zj
max
k∈K
j∏
i=1
1{zi ∈ Zf (νi, k)}
≥
∣∣∣∣∣jκ+
j∑
i=1
|Srˆ,r˜(νi|σ, τ)|−
∣∣∣∣∣
+
+ n
j∑
i=1
[
rˆ + r˜ + κ+H(νi|στ)− |Srˆ,r˜(νi|σ, τ)|+
]
+O(j log2 n), (75)
for each νj ∈×ji=1 Pn(Z|U ;στ). This observation follows since∑
zj∈Zj
max
k∈K
j∏
i=1
1{zi ∈ Zf (νi, k)} =
∣∣∣∣∣ ⋃
k∈K
j×
i=1
Zf (νi, k)
∣∣∣∣∣ (76)
≤ 2
njκ maxk∈K
∏j
i=1 |Zf (νi, k)|
minzj∈⋃k∈KZjf (νi,k) |Kf (zj , νj)| (77)
≤ 2njκ−n|jκ+
∑j
i=1 |Srˆ,r˜(νi|σ,τ)|−|++O(log2 n) max
k∈K
j∏
i=1
|Zf (νi, k)| (78)
≤ 2n
[
jκ−|jκ+∑ji=1 |Srˆ,r˜(νi|σ,τ)|−|+]+O(log2 n)
·max
k∈K
j∏
i=1
2n[rˆ+r˜+H(νi|στ)]+O(log2 n)
minz∈Zf (νi,k) |M¯f (z, νi, k)|
(79)
≤ 2−n|jκ+
∑j
i=1 |Srˆ,r˜(νi|σ,τ)|−|++O(log2 n)
· 2n
∑j
i=1[rˆ+r˜+κ+H(νi|στ)−|Srˆ,r˜(νi|σ,τ)|+]+O(j log2 n) (80)
where (76) is because maxk∈K
∏j
i=1 1{zi ∈ Zf (νi, k)} = 1 for all zj ∈×ji=1Zf (νi, k) and is 0 otherwise; (77)
is by Lemma 13; (78) is because f ∈ F† ; (79) is by Lemma 13 and Equation (10); finally (80) is because f ∈ F∗.
With these observations, noting that Appendix B-A produces deterministic codes, the following direct calculation
yields Equation (69):
ωfj ,ϕj
=
∑
zj∈Zj
2−njκ max
k∈K
j∏
i=1
p(zi|k) (81)
=
∑
zj∈Zj
2−njκ max
k∈K
j∏
i=1
 ∑
mˆ∈Mˆ,
m˜∈M˜
∑
x∈Tρ(uf (mˆ,m˜,k))
2−n(rˆ+r˜)|Tρ(uf (mˆ, m˜, k))|−1q(zi|x)
 (82)
=
∑
zj∈Zj
2−nj(rˆ+r˜+κ) max
k∈K
j∏
i=1
 ∑
ν∈Pn(Z|U ;στ)
|M¯(zi, ν, k)|2−n[H(ν|στ)+Fn(ν||q,ρ|στ)]+O(log2 n)
 (83)
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=
∑
zj∈Zj
2−nj(rˆ+r˜+κ) max
k∈K
j∏
i=1
 ∑
ν∈Pn(Z|U ;στ)
1{zi ∈ Zf (ν, k)}2−n[H(ν|στ)+Fn(ν||q,ρ|στ)−|Srˆ,r˜(νi|σ,τ)|
+]+O(log2 n)

(84)
=
∑
νj∈×ji=1 Pn(Z|U ;στ)
2−n
∑j
i=1[rˆ+r˜+κ+H(νi|στ)+Fn(νi||q,ρ|στ)−|Srˆ,r˜(νi|σ,τ)|+]+O(j log2 n)
·
∑
zj∈Zj
max
k∈K
j∏
i=1
1{zi ∈ Zf (ν, k)} (85)
≤ max
νj∈×ji=1 Pn(Z|U ;στ)
2
−n
[|jκ+∑ji=1|Srˆ,r˜(νi|σ,τ)|−|++∑ji=1 Fn(νi||q,ρ|στ)]+O(j log2 n); (86)
where (81) is because Z1, . . . ,Zj are independent given k ∈ K, and because the key is uniformly distributed over
{1, . . . , 2njκ}; (82) is by the law of total probability and definition of Z1, . . . ,Zj ; (83) is by further subdividing
the summation based upon the empirical distribution of zi|uf (mˆ, m˜, k), using Lemma 8, and then performing the
summations over mˆ and m˜; (84) is because f ∈ F∗; (85) is a result of exchanging the summations and product;
finally, (86) is by (75) and because of Equation (12).
2) Probability of randomly choosing a code in F∗ ∩ F†: Once again, let RV F denote the randomly chosen
encoder from Appendix B-A. To verify Equation (73), it will be helpful to first show that
Pr (F /∈ F1) < 2 |Z|n |Pn(Z|U ;στ)|e−n2/4 = e−n2/4+O(n) (87)
where F1 is the set of all encoders f such that
1
n
log2 |{mˆ : z ∈ Tνσ(wf (mˆ))}| =
∣∣rˆ − I(νσ, τ) +O(n−1 log2 n)∣∣+ +O(n−1 log2 n)
= |rˆ − I(νσ, τ)|+ +O(n−1 log2 n) (88)
for each z ∈ ⋃mˆ∈Mˆ Tνσ(wf (mˆ)) and ν ∈ Pn(Z|U ;στ). To show Equation (87), observe that
|{mˆ : z ∈ Tνσ(wF (mˆ))}| =
∑
mˆ∈Mˆ
1{z ∈ Tνσ(wF (mˆ))}
for each z ∈ Z and ν ∈ P(Z|U). Furthermore, for each mˆ ∈ Mˆ, the 1{z ∈ Tνσ(wF (mˆ))} are Bernoulli
(2−nI(νσ,τ)+O(log2 n)) RVs by Lemma 9, and independent by definition. Therefore, Equation (87) follows by
Corollary 12, the union bound, and because the restriction to z ∈ ⋃mˆ∈Mˆ Tνσ(wF (mˆ)) guarantees that {mˆ :
z ∈ Tνσ(wf (mˆ))} 6= ∅.
Similar proofs will be used to show
Pr (F /∈ F∗) ≤ e−n2/4+O(n), (89)
and
Pr
(
F /∈ F†) ≤ e−n2/4+O(n); (90)
Equation (73) directly follows from Equations (89), (90), and the union bound. In order to prove both Equation (93)
and (90), it will be helpful to fix the values of wF , while leaving uF random. It will also be helpful to ensure that
the code will be contained in F1 for the fixed values of wF . To this end, for each w|Mˆ| ,×|Mˆ|i=1 wi ∈×|Mˆ|i=1 Tτ ,
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let Fw|Mˆ| = F |{F ∈ F(w|Mˆ|)}, where F(w|Mˆ|) is the set of encoders f such that wf (i) = wi for each i ∈ Mˆ.
It is important to observe that F(w|Mˆ|) is either a subset of, or mutually exclusive with, F1 for each w|Mˆ|. The
set of w|Mˆ| for which F(w|Mˆ|) ⊆ F1 will be helpful to distinguish, thus let W1 , {w|Mˆ| : F(w|Mˆ|) ⊆ F1}.
Now, to prove Equation (89), first observe that
Pr (F /∈ F∗) =
∑
w|Mˆ|∈×|Mˆ|i=1 Tτ (w)
Pr
(
Fw|Mˆ| /∈ F∗
)
Pr
(
F ∈ F(w|Mˆ|)
)
≤ Pr (F /∈ F1) +
∑
w|Mˆ|∈W1
Pr
(
Fw|Mˆ| /∈ F∗
)
Pr
(
F ∈ F(w|Mˆ|)
)
≤ Pr (F /∈ F1) + max
w|Mˆ|∈W1
Pr
(
Fw|Mˆ| /∈ F∗
)
(91)
because the events F ∈ F(w|Mˆ|) are mutually exclusive for each w|Mˆ|. At the same time∣∣∣M¯F
w|Mˆ|
(z, ν, k)
∣∣∣ = ∑
mˆ∈Mˆ
m˜∈M˜
1{z ∈ Tν(uF
w|Mˆ|
(mˆ, m˜, k))}, (92)
for each w|Mˆ|, z ∈ Z , and ν ∈ Pn(Z|U ;στ). Note 1{z ∈ Tν(uF
w|Mˆ|
(mˆ, m˜, k))} is a Bernoulli(2−nI(ν,σ|τ)+O(log2 n))
RV for all mˆ such that z ∈ Tνσ(wmˆ) by Lemma 9, while 1{z ∈ Tν(uF
w|Mˆ|
(mˆ, m˜, k))} = 0 for all mˆ such that
z /∈ Tνσ(wmˆ) by Lemma 6. What’s more, each value of 1{z ∈ Tν(uF
w|Mˆ|
(mˆ, m˜, k))} in the sum is independent
by the code construction. Therefore,
max
w|Mˆ|∈W1
Pr
(
Fw|Mˆ| /∈ F∗
) ≤ |Z|n|K||Pn(Z|U ;στ)|e−n2/4+O(n) = e−n2/4+O(n) (93)
follows by Corollary 12 and the union bound, since
∣∣∣M¯F
w|Mˆ|
(z, ν, k)
∣∣∣ is a sum of | {mˆ : z ∈ Tνσ(wmˆ)} |2nr˜ =
2n[r˜+|rˆ−I(νσ,τ)|
+]+O(log2 n) independent Bernoulli(2−nI(ν,σ|τ)+O(log2 n)) RVs for each z ∈ ⋃mˆ Tνσ(wmˆ).
Similarly to prove Equation (90), as before
Pr
(
F /∈ F†) ≤ Pr (F /∈ F1) + max
w|Mˆ|∈W1
Pr
(
Fw|Mˆ| /∈ F†
)
. (94)
For each zj ∈×ji=1⋃mˆ∈Mˆ Tνiσ(wmˆ) and νj ∈×ji=1 Pn(Z|U ;στ), the term |KFw|Mˆ| (zj , νj)| is a sum of
indicator RVs, specifically
|KF
w|Mˆ|
(zj , νj)| =
∑
k∈K
1{k ∈ KF
w|Mˆ|
(zj , νj)}. (95)
Each 1{k ∈ KF
w|Mˆ|
(zj , νj)} is Bernoulli(b), where
− 1
n
log2 b ≤ −
j
n
log2 j +
j∑
i=1
|r˜ + |rˆ − I(νiσ, τ)|+ − I(νi, σ|τ)|− +O(n−1 log2 n), (96)
by Lemma 10 because
1{k ∈ KF
w|Mˆ|
(zj , νj)} = 1{∩ji=1{zi ∈
⋃
mˆ∈Mˆ,
m˜∈M˜
Tνi(uF
w|Mˆ|
(mˆ, m˜, k))}}
= 1{∩ji=1{zi ∈
⋃
mˆ∈Mˆ:zi∈Tνiσ(wmˆ),
m˜∈M˜
Tνi(uF
w|Mˆ|
(mˆ, m˜, k))}},
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w|Mˆ| ∈W1, and because 2nr˜ ≥ 8j ln j for r˜ > 0 and large enough n. Furthermore, 1{k ∈ KF
w|Mˆ|
(zj , νj)} are
independent for different k since
1{k ∈ KF
w|Mˆ|
(zj , νj)} = 1{∩ji=1{zi ∈
⋃
mˆ∈Mˆ,
m˜∈M˜
Tνi(uF
w|Mˆ|
(mˆ, m˜, k))}} (97)
=
j∏
i=1
1− ∏
mˆ∈Mˆ,
m˜∈M˜
1
{
zi /∈ Tνi(uF
w|Mˆ|
(mˆ, m˜, k))
} , (98)
and uF
w|Mˆ|
(mˆ, m˜, k) is independently chosen from Tσ(wmˆ) for each value of k ∈ K. Now,
max
w|Mˆ|∈W1
Pr
(
Fw|Mˆ| /∈ F†
) ≤ |Z|nj |Pn(Z|U ;στ)|je−n2/4 = e−n2/4+O(n) (99)
follows by Corollary 12 and the union bound; hence Equation (90) is due to Equations (87), (94), and (99).
D. Proof of Theorem 3
Proof:
First fix finite sets U and W , and distributions ρ ∈ P(X|U), σ ∈ P(U  W), and τ ∈ P(W) such that
L(t, q|ρ, σ, τ) > 0. The proof follows by first showing that if (r, α, κ, rˆ, r˜, κ˜) ∈ Rγ1,γ2(ρ, σ, τ), where
Rγ1,γ2(ρ, σ, τ)
,

(r, α, κ, rˆ, r˜, κ˜) :
r − r˜ − rˆ ≤ 0
κ˜− κ ≤ 0
r˜ + jκ˜ = I(tρ, σ|τ)− γ1
r˜ + rˆ + jκ˜ = I(tρ, στ)− γ2
α− jκ˜ ≤ 0
jκ˜ ≤ Lγ1,γ2(t, q|ρ, σ, τ)

(100)
and
Lγ1,γ2(t, q|ρ, σ, τ) , min
ν∈P(Z|U)
F(ν||q, ρ|στ) + S−γ1,−γ2+γ1(tρ, ν|σ, τ)
for some strictly positive γ1 and γ2, then (r, α, κ) is achievable. From there, that all (r, α, κ) ∈ R∗γ1,γ2(ρ, σ, τ),
where
R∗γ1,γ2(ρ, σ, τ)
,

(r, α, κ) :
α− jκ ≤ 0
α+ r ≤ I(tρ, στ)− γ2
α ≤ I(tρ, σ|τ)− γ1
α ≤ Lγ1,γ2(t, q|ρ, σ, τ)

, (101)
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are achievable directly follows by applying Fourier-Motzkin elimination (see [20, Appendix D]) to Rγ1,γ2(ρ, σ, τ) in
order to eliminate rˆ, r˜, and κˆ. Thus, as the final step, showing that
⋃
γ1,γ2
R∗γ1,γ2(ρ, σ, τ) = lim(γ1,γ2)→(0,0)R∗γ1,γ2(ρ, σ, τ)
which yields the stated rate region.
For the first step, demonstrating that (r, α, κ, rˆ, r˜, κ˜) ∈ Rγ1,γ2(ρ, σ, τ) implies (r, α, κ) is achievable can be
done essentially via Theorem 14. But notice, Theorem 14 is concerned with constructing codes for a finite n, and
clearly the empirical distributions of the code will vary with the value of n. Because of this, define the following
approximating distributions and error terms
τn := argmin
τ ′∈Pn(W)
|τ ′ − τ |
σn := argmin
σ′∈Pn(UW): if σ(u|w)=0 then σ′(u|w)=0
|σ′ − σ|
ρn := argmin
ρ′∈Pn(X|U ;σnτn)
|ρ′ − ρ|
∆1,n := sup
µ∈P(Y|U)
sup
n′>n
|Fn(µ||t, ρn|σnτn)− F(µ||t, ρ|στ)|
∆2,n := sup
ν∈P(Z|U)
sup
n′>n
|Fn(ν||q, ρn|σnτn)− F(ν||q, ρ|στ)|
∆3,n := sup
µ∈P(Y|U)⋃P(Z|U) supn′>n |I(µ, σn′ |τn′)− I(µ, σ|τ)|
∆4,n := sup
µ∈P(Y|U)⋃P(Z|U) supn′>n |I(µ, σn′τn′)− I(µ, στ)|
∆n := max
i∈{1,2,3,4}
∆i,n.
It is important to note that ∆n goes to zero monotonically due to the continuity of entropy. Next, suppose that
(r, α, κ, rˆ, r˜, κ˜) ∈ Rγ1,γ2(ρ, σ, τ), and observe that for all large enough n, there exists a (r, αn, κ, n, n)-AA code
such that
−n log2 n ≥ min
µ∈Pn(Y|U ;σnτn)
Fn(µ||t, ρn|σnτn)− |jκ˜+ Srˆ,r˜(µ|σn, τn)|− +O(n−1 log2 n), (102)
and
αn ≥ min
νj∈×ji=1 Pn(Z|U ;στ)
∣∣∣∣∣jκ˜+
j∑
i=1
|Srˆ,r˜(νi|σn, τn)|−
∣∣∣∣∣
+
+
j∑
i=1
Fn(νi||q, ρn|σnτn) +O(jn−1 log2 n), (103)
by Theorem 14 since r ≤ rˆ+r˜ and κ ≥ κ˜ are requirements of (r, α, κ, rˆ, r˜, κ˜) ∈ Rγ1,γ2(ρ, σ, τ). Hence, proving that
limn→∞ n = 0 and limn→∞ αn ≥ α also proves (r, α, κ) is achievable. Towards the goal of proving limn→∞ n =
0, using Equation (102) it follows that
n ≤ max
µ∈P(Y|U ;σnτn)
2
−n
(
Fn(µ||t,ρn|σnτn)−|S−γ1,−γ2+γ1 (tρ,µ|σn,τn)|−
)
+O(log2 n),
≤ max
µ∈P(Y|U ;σnτn)
2
−n
(
F(µ||t,ρ|στ)−|S−γ1,−γ2+γ1 (tρ,µ|σ,τ)|−
)
+3n∆n+O(log2 n)
≤ max
µ∈P(Y|U)
2
−n
(
F(µ||t,ρ|στ)−|S−γ1,−γ2+γ1 (tρ,µ|σ,τ)|−
)
+3n∆n+O(log2 n) (104)
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by the definition of ∆n. If the maximum of Equation (104) is achieved by µ = tρ, then Equation (104) gives
lim
n→∞ n ≤ limn→∞ 2
−n[min(γ1,γ2)−3∆n−O(n−1 log2 n)] ≤ lim
n→∞ 2
−n2 min(γ1,γ2) = 0, (105)
since γ1 and γ2 are strictly positive constants, while limn→∞∆n = 0 and limn→∞ n−1 log2 n = 0. Alternatively, if
the maximum of Equation (104) is not achieved when µ = tρ then F(µ||t, ρ|στ) > 0, and accordingly Equation (104)
yields
lim
n→∞ n ≤ limn→∞ 2
−n[F(µ||t,ρ|στ)−3∆n−O(n−1 log2 n)] ≤ lim
n→∞ 2
−n2 F(µ||t,ρ|στ) = 0. (106)
In both cases, limn→∞ n = 0. The inequality limn→∞ αn ≥ α from Equation (103) is derived as follows
αn +O(jn
−1 log2 n) + 3j∆n
≥ min
ν1∈Pn(Z|U ;στ),...
νj∈Pn(Z|U ;στ)
∣∣∣∣∣jκ˜+
j∑
i=1
|Srˆ,r˜(νi|σn, τn)|−
∣∣∣∣∣
+
+
j∑
i=1
Fn(νi||q, ρn|σnτn) + 3j∆n,
≥ min
ν1∈P(Z|U),...
νj∈P(Z|U)
∣∣∣∣∣jκ˜+
j∑
i=1
|Srˆ,r˜(νi|σ, τ)|−
∣∣∣∣∣
+
+
j∑
i=1
F(νi||q, ρ|στ) (107)
= min
ν1∈P(Z|U),...
νj∈P(Z|U)
∣∣∣∣∣jκ˜−
j∑
i=1
|jκ˜− S−γ1,−γ2+γ1(tρ, νi|σ, τ)|+
∣∣∣∣∣
+
+
j∑
i=1
F(νi||q, ρ|στ) (108)
≥ min
ν1∈P(Z|U),...
νj∈P(Z|U)
∣∣∣∣∣jκ˜−
j∑
i=1
F(νi||q, ρ|στ)
∣∣∣∣∣
+
+
j∑
i=1
F(νi||q, ρ|στ) (109)
≥ min
ν1∈P(Z|U),...
νj∈P(Z|U)
max
(
jκ˜,
j∑
i=1
F(νi||q, ρ|στ)
)
≥ jκ˜ ≥ α; (110)
where (107) is by the definition of ∆n; (108) is because
Srˆ,r˜(νi|σ, τ) = r˜ − I(νi, σ|τ) + |rˆ − I(νiσ, τ)|+
= I(tρ, σ|τ)− γ1 − jκ˜− I(νi, σ|τ) + |I(tρσ, τ)− γ2 + γ1 − I(νiσ, τ)|+
= −(jκ˜− S−γ1,−γ2+γ1(tρ, νi|σ, τ));
(109) is because jk˜ ≤ F(ν||q, ρ|στ) + S−γ1,−γ2+γ1(tρ, ν|σ, τ) and F(ν||q, ρ|στ) ≥ 0 for all ν ∈ P(Z|U);
finally (110) is because if a ≥ b then |a−b|+ +b = a while if a < b then |a−b|+ +b = b. Hence, limn→∞ αn ≥ α
from Equation (110) since limn→∞ n−1 log2 n→ 0 and limn→∞∆n = 0.
Having shown that (r, α, κ) ∈ R∗γ1,γ2(ρ, σ, τ) are achievable, what remains is to show that⋃
γ1,γ2
R∗γ1,γ2(ρ, σ, τ) = lim(γ1,γ2)→(0,0)R
∗
γ1,γ2(ρ, σ, τ).
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This can be proven by showing
R∗γ1,γ2(ρ, σ, τ) ⊆ R∗γ∗1 ,γ∗2 (ρ, σ, τ) (111)
for all 0 < γ∗1 ≤ γ1 and 0 < γ∗2 ≤ γ2. To this end, suppose that (r, α, κ) ∈ R∗γ1,γ2(ρ, σ, τ) and immediately observe
that
α− jκ ≤ 0, (112)
α+ r ≤ I(tρ, στ)− γ2 ≤ I(tρ, στ)− γ∗2 , (113)
α ≤ I(tρ, σ|τ)− γ1 ≤ I(tρ, στ)− γ∗1 . (114)
Additionally,
α ≤ Lγ∗1 ,γ∗2 (t, q|ρ, σ, τ) (115)
since
a− γ1 + |b+ γ1 − γ2|+ = a+ max(b− γ2,−γ1) ≤ a+ max(b− γ∗2 ,−γ∗1 ) = a− γ∗1 + |b+ γ1 − γ∗2 |+
for all real numbers a and b. Combining Equations (112)–(115) proves that (r, α, κ) ∈ R∗γ∗1 ,γ∗2 (ρ, σ, τ).
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
Similar to Appendix B, Appendices C-A through C-C are dedicated to proving the following theorem:
Theorem 15. If there exists an (r, α, κ, , j, n)-AA code for DM-ASC(t, q), and j
√
 < 1, then for large enough n
and positive real number β ≤ r there also exists a
(r − β, α+ β − 2n−1 log2 ne, κ+ [1 + j−1]β,
√
, j, n)−AA code for DM-AIC(t, q).
Proof:
To prove Theorem 15, we use the random coding construction in Appendix C-A. Appendix C-A’s code construc-
tion, with probability greater than 1−j√, produces a code (f˜ j , ϕ˜j) where εf˜j ,ϕ˜j ≤
√
 as shown in Appendix C-B.
Furthermore, with probability greater than 1−je−n2/4+j(n+1)r, Appendix C-A’s code construction produces a code
such that ωf˜j ,ϕ˜j < 2
−n(α+β)+2 log2 ne, as shown in C-C. For large enough n, these results guarantee the existence
of a code satisfying the theorem statement since j
√
 < 1 and limn→∞ je−n
2/4+j(n+1)r = 0.
A. Code Construction
For a given positive real number β ≤ r, we shall use the following construction to transform codes to send j-
messages chosen uniformly from M , {1, . . . , 2nr} with a secret key drawn uniformly from K1 , {1, . . . , 2njκ},
into codes to send j-messages chosen uniformly from M˜ , {1, . . . , 2n(r−β)} with a secret key drawn uniformly
from K1 × K2, where K2 , {1, . . . , 2n(j+1)β}. The starting codes will be denoted (fi, ϕi) ∈ P(X |M,K1) ×
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P(M∪{!} |Y ,K1), and the resulting codes after the transformation will be denoted (f˜i, ϕ˜i) ∈ P(X |M˜,K1,K2)×
P(M˜∪{!} |Y ,K1,K2) for each round i ∈ {1, . . . , j}. New codes are necessary for each round in order to prevent
attacks where the adversary sends a previous rounds’ message.
Random codebook generation: Independently for each k2 ∈ K2 and i ∈ {1, . . . , j}, select a mapping gk2,i : M˜ →
M uniformly from the set of all injective mappings from M˜ to M.
Encoders:
f˜i(x|m′, k1, k2) , fi(x|gk2,i(m′), k1)
for each (x,m′, k1, k2) ∈ X × M˜ ×K1 ×K2 and i ∈ {1, . . . , j}.
Decoders:
ϕ˜i(m
′|y, k1, k2) =
ϕi(gk2,i(m
′)|y, k1) if m′ 6= !
ϕi(!|y, k) + ϕi(M− gk2,i(M˜)|y, k1) otherwise
,
for all (y, k1, k2) ∈ Y ×K1 ×K2, m′ ∈ M˜ ∪ ! and i ∈ {1, . . . , j}.
B. Message error analysis
The average probability of message error over all possible (f˜i, ϕ˜i) is equal to the probability of message error
for (fi, ϕi). Indeed, this is a direct consequence of
εf˜i,ϕ˜i(m
′, k1, k2) = 1−
∑
y∈Y,
x∈X
ϕ˜i(m
′|y, k1, k2)t(y|x)f˜i(x|m′, k1, k2)
= 1−
∑
y∈Y,
x∈X
ϕi(gk2,i(m
′)|y, k1)t(y|x)fi(x|gk2,i(m′), k1)
= εfi,ϕi(gk2,i(m
′), k1), (116)
and the fact that the mapping gk2,i is chosen uniformly from the set of of all injective mappings. Therefore,
E[εF˜i,Φ˜i ] =
∑
m′∈M˜,k1∈K1
2−n(r−β+κ)
( ∑
m∈M
2−nrεfi,ϕi(m, k1)
)
= εfi,ϕi (117)
since gk2,i is chosen uniformly from the set of all injective mappings M˜ →M.
Now,
Pr
(
εF˜i,Φ˜i ≥
√

)
≤ εfi,φi√

≤ √
directly follows from Markov’s inequality for each i ∈ {1, . . . , j}. Then,
Pr
(
∪ji=1{εF˜i,Φ˜i ≥
√
}
)
≤ j√
comes directly from the union bound.
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C. Authentication rate analysis
Here we shall show that given the original code has average authentication rate α, the new average authentication
rate will be
α˜ ≥ α+ β − 2n−1 log2 ne (118)
as long as (f˜ j , ϕ˜j) ∈ G∗, where G∗ is the set of (f˜ j , ϕ˜j) for which∣∣∣{k2 : {m′ ∈ gk2,`(M˜)− {m`}} ∩ji=1 {mi ∈ gk2,i(M˜)}}∣∣∣ ≤ (ne)2 (119)
for all m′ ×mj ∈M×Mj . Furthermore, we shall show that
Pr
(
(F˜ j , Φ˜j) /∈ G∗
)
≤ je−n
2
4 +n(j+1)r. (120)
Hence, as n→∞ the probability of a code satisfying (118) goes to one.
First, we shall demonstrate that Equation (119) is sufficient to guarantee (118). Afterwards, we shall show
that (120) is a lower bound on the probability of a randomly chosen codes constructed according to Appendix C-A
satisfying (119).
1) Authentication rate given (f˜ j , ϕ˜j) ∈ G∗: To show
α˜ ≥ α+ β − 2n−1 log2 ne (121)
for all (f˜ j , ϕ˜j) ∈ G∗(f j , ϕj) and i ∈ {1, . . . , j}, it will be helpful to first recognize that
2−nα = max
i∈{1,...,j},
ψ∈P(Y|Zj)
∑
xj∈X j ,
y∈Y,
zj∈Zj ,
mj∈Mj ,
k1∈K1
ψ(y|zj)2−nj(r+κ)ϕi(M−{mi}|y, k1)
j∏
`=1
[q(z`|x`)f`(x`|m`, k1)] (122)
and
2−nα˜ = max
i∈{1,...,j},
ψ∈P(Y|Zj)
∑
xj∈X j ,
y∈Y,
zj∈Zj ,
m˜j∈M˜j ,
k1∈K1,
k2∈K2
ψ(y|zj)2−nj(r+κ)−nβϕ˜i(M˜ − {m˜i}|y, k1, k2)
j∏
`=1
[
q(z`|x`)f˜`(x`|m˜`, k1, k2)
]
(123)
both follow by applying the law of total probability to the definition of the average authentication rate. The goal
of the proof is to express an upper bound on the RHS of (123) in terms of the RHS of (122). Towards this goal,
the RHS of (123) can be expressed in terms of (fi, ϕi), specifically as
max
i∈{1,...,j},
ψ∈P(Y|Zj)
∑
xj∈X j ,
y∈Y,
zj∈Zj ,
m˜j∈M˜j ,
k1∈K1,
k2∈K2
ψ(y|zj)2−nj(r+κ)−nβϕi(gk2,i(M˜)− {gk2,i(m˜i)}|y, k1)
j∏
`=1
[q(z`|x`)f`(x`|gk2,`(m˜`), k1)]
(124)
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by using the definition of (f˜i, ϕ˜i), and recognizing that gk2,i(M˜ − {m˜i}) = gk2,i(M˜)− {gk2,i(m˜)} since gk2,i is
an injective function for all k2 ∈ K2 and i ∈ {1, . . . , j}. Notice now that all terms in (124) that contain a m˜j ∈ M˜j
are only dependent on the value after the mapping of gk2,i is applied. In fact, (124) is equal to
max
i∈{1,...,j},
ψ∈P(Y|Zj)
∑
xj∈X j ,
y∈Y,
zj∈Zj ,
k1∈K1,
m`∈M`,
m′∈M
ψ(y|zj)2−nj(r+κ)−nβϕi(m′|y, k1)
(
j∏
`=1
[q(z`|x`)f`(x`|m`, k1)]
)
·
∑
k2∈K2
1{m′ ∈ gk2,i(M˜)− {mi}}
j∏
`=1
1{m` ∈ gk2,`(M˜)} (125)
since gk2,i is an injective function for all k2 ∈ K2 and i ∈ {1, . . . , j}. But, (f˜ j , ϕ˜j) ∈ G∗(f j , ϕj) requires that the
summation over K2 in (125) has upper bound (ne)2 when m′ 6= mi and 0 when m′ = mi, and hence
2−nα ≤ max
i∈{1,...,j},
ψ∈P(Y|Zj)
(ne)2
∑
xj∈X j ,
y∈Y,
zj∈Zj ,
k1∈K1,
m`∈M`,
m′∈M
ψ(y|zj)2−nj(r+κ)−nβϕi(m′|y, k1)
(
j∏
`=1
[q(z`|x`)f`(x`|m`, k1)]
)
1{m′ 6= m}
= max
i∈{1,...,j},
ψ∈P(Y|Zj)
(ne)22−nβ
∑
xj∈X j ,
y∈Y,
zj∈Zj ,
k1∈K1,
m`∈M`
ψ(y|zj)2−nj(r+κ)ϕi(M−{mi}|y, k1)
(
j∏
`=1
[q(z`|x`)f`(x`|m`, k1)]
)
.
(126)
The combination of Equations (122) and (126) proves (121).
2) Probability of randomly choosing a code in G∗: Equation (120) follows from Corollary 12 and the union
bound after demonstrating that (which we shall return to later)
Pr
(
{m′ ∈ Gk2,`(M˜)− {m`}} ∩ji=1 {mi ∈ Gk2,i(M˜)}
)
≤ 2−n(j+1)β , (127)
where Gk2,i is the RV denoting randomly chosen injective mapping in the code construction
9, for a give m′×mj ∈
M×Mj , ` ∈ {1, . . . , j}, and k2 ∈ K2. Indeed, it is required that∑
k2∈K2
1{m′ ∈ gk2,`(M˜)− {m`}}
j∏
i=1
1{mi ∈ gk2,i(M˜)} ≤ (ne)2 (128)
for all m′ ×mj ∈ M×Mj and ` ∈ {1, . . . , j} in order for (f˜ j , ϕ˜j) ∈ G∗. But, the mappings gk2,i : M˜ → M
are independently chosen for each k2 ∈ K2 and i ∈ {1, . . . , j}. As a result, the probability that a set of mappings
is chosen that satisfy (128) is equivalent to the probability that∑
k2∈K2
1{m′ ∈ Gk2,`(M˜)− {m`}}
j∏
i=1
1{mi ∈ Gk2,i(M˜)} ≤ (ne)2. (129)
9It should be noted that the set of mappings gk2,i in conjunction with (f
j , ϕj) determines the value of (f˜j , ϕ˜j).
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The probability of (129) is greater than 1 − e−n2/4 by Corollary 12 since the LHS of (129) is a sum of |K2| =
2n(j+1)β independent Bernoulli RVs whose parameter is bounded above in Equation (127). Hence, Equation (120)
by applying the union bound to consider all m′ ×mj ∈M×Mj and ` ∈ {1, . . . , j} simultaneously.
Returning now to prove Equation (127). First note that
Pr
(
m′ ∈ Gk2,`(M˜)− {m`}} ∩ji=1 {mi ∈ Gk2,i(M˜)}
)
= Pr
(
{m′,m`} ⊂ Gk2,`(M˜)}
) j∏
i=1(6=`)
Pr
(
mi ∈ Gk2,i(M˜)
)
, (130)
since Gk2,i is independent for each i ∈ {1, . . . , `}. The probability that m ∈ Gk2,i(M˜) (alternatively ({m,m′} ⊂
Gk2,i(M˜)) is equal to the ratio of the number of subsets A ⊂ M such that m ∈ A (resp. {m,m′} ∈ A) and
|A| = |M˜| to the number of subsets B ⊂ M such that |B| = |M˜|, since Gk2,i is uniform over the set of all
injective mappings from M˜ to M. Hence,
Pr
(
m ∈ Gk2,i(M˜)
)
=
 2nr − 1
2n(r−β) − 1
/ 2nr
2n(r−β)
 = 2−nβ (131)
and similarly
Pr
(
{m,m′} ⊂ Gk2,i(M˜)
)
=
 2nr − 2
2n(r−β) − 2
/ 2nr
2n(r−β)

= 2−nβ
2n(r−β) − 1
2nr − 1 = 2
−2nβ 1− 2n(β−r)
1− 2−nr ≤ 2
−2nβ . (132)
Combining Equations (130)–(132) yields Equation (127).
D. Proof of Theorem 4
Proof:
If (r, α, κ) ∈ CAA(j)(t, q), then there exists a sequence of (rn, αn, κn, n, j, n)-AA(j) codes, (f jn, ϕjn), such that
lim
n→∞ |(rn, αn, κn, n, n)− (r, α, κ, 0, n)| = 0. (133)
Hence, there exists a sequence βn ≤ rn such that limn→∞ β = β ≤ r, as well as a sequence of (rn − βn, αn +
βn − 2n−1 log2 ne, κ + [1 + j−1]βn,
√
n, j, n)-AA codes, (f˜ jn, ϕ˜
j
n), by Theorem 15 since j is fixed and thus
limn→∞ j
√
n = 0. Therefore,
(r − β, α+ β, κ+ [1 + j−1]β) ∈ CAA(j)(t, q) (134)
since
lim
n→∞ |(rn − βn, αn + βn − 2n
−1 log2 ne, κn + [1 + j
−1]βn,
√
n, n)− (r − β, α+ β, κ+ [1 + j−1]β, 0, n)| = 0.
(135)
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APPENDIX D
ERROR IN [2]
For this section, we switch to using the notation of [2]. We make no effort to reproduce or explain their notation
here. The error occurs in the code construction (Appendix A), and revolves around how their decoder is defined.
To understand this error, we start at [2, page 4535], and discuss their decoder.
First introduced is set
Dk1m|k2 ,
{
y : Vk1k2m ≺ Vkˆ1k2mˆ ∀ [kˆ1, mˆ] 6= [k1,m]
}
where Vk1k2m ∈ P(Y|X ), and ≺ is defined by if Vk1k2m ≺ Vkˆ1k2mˆ, then
D(Vk1k2m||Wt|P ) +
∣∣∣I(P, Vkˆ1k2mˆ)−RK1 −RM ∣∣∣ < ξ.
It is important to note that Vk1k2m ≺ Vkˆ1k2mˆ does not imply Vkˆ1k2mˆ 6≺ Vk1k2m, and hence the regions Dk1m|k2
are not distinct for different k1,m. The decoder is then defined by
φ(y, k1, k2) =
m if y ∈ Dk1m|k20 otherwise ,
with the caveat that if there exists a kˆ1, mˆ such that Vk1k2m ≺ Vkˆ1k2mˆ and Vkˆ1k2mˆ ≺ Vk1k2m, then one of the
messages is chosen arbitrarily10. This arbitrary choice is never defined; this is problematic since different choices
will cause their analysis to fail in different sections.
Let us, in good faith, assume that Equation (63) does in fact equal Equation (62), that is
1
enR
∑
k1,k2,m
P(αna|m, k1, k2, c)
=
1
enR
∑
k1,k2,m
Wnt (D0|k2 ∪ ∪kˆ1 6=k1,mˆDkˆ1mˆ|k2 |xk1k2m).
This would imply that an erasure occurs if y ∈ Dkˆ1mˆ|k2 for some kˆ1 6= k1, hence the arbitrary choice mentioned
before would always be in favor of [k′1,m
′] for which k′1 6= k1. But now, the unjustified Equation (64) cannot
follow from Equation (63) since Dk1m|k2 are not disjoint. Indeed, if ∪kˆ1 6=k1,mˆDkˆ1mˆ|k2 ∩ Dk1m|k2 6= ∅, then(
D0|k2 ∪ ∪kˆ1 6=k1,mˆDkˆ1mˆ|k2
)
6⊂ D¯k1m|k2 .
This is actually a rather extreme error as it allows for reliable transmissions above the channel’s capacity.
So, now we rectify this error and, in good faith, assume the rest of their paper is correct. Starting with
Equation (63), which can be bounded as follows
1
enR
∑
k1,k2,m
Wnt (D0|k2 ∪ ∪kˆ1 6=k1,mˆDkˆ1mˆ|k2 |xk1k2m)
≤ 1
enR
∑
k1,k2,m
Wnt (D0|k2 |xk1k2m) +Wnt (∪kˆ1 6=k1,mˆDkˆ1mˆ|k2 |xk1k2m)
10Although we will not use this fact, we feel compelled to point out that there potentially exist an exponential number of such k1,m for
which y ∈ Dk1m|k2 .
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≤ 1
enR
∑
k1,k2,m
Wnt (D¯k1m|k2 |xk1k2m) +Wnt (∪kˆ1 6=k1,mˆDkˆ1mˆ|k2 |xk1k2m).
At this point, it should also be noted that
max
 1
enR
∑
k1,k2,m
Wnt (D¯k1m|k2 |xk1k2m),
1
enR
∑
k1,k2,m
Wnt (∪kˆ1 6=k1,mˆDkˆ1mˆ|k2 |xk1k2m),

constitutes a lower bound on the total probability error (erasure and undetected) under no attack. Hence, these two
summations can be analyzed individually without impact to the total performance. A tight upper bound on the first
summation is already derived in Equations (65)–(69) and is less than
max
V,Vˆ :V 6≺Vˆ
exp−n
[
D(V ||Wt|P ) +
∣∣∣I(P, Vˆ )−RM −RK1∣∣∣+] .
The second summation can be bounded as follows
1
enR
∑
k1,k2,m
Wnt (∪kˆ1 6=k1,mˆDkˆ1mˆ|k2 |xk1k2m)
=
1
enR
∑
k1,k2,m
Wnt (∪V TV (xk1k2m) ∩ ∪kˆ1 6=k1,mˆ ∪Vˆ :Vˆ≺V TVˆ (xkˆ1,k2,mˆ)|xk1k2m)
=
1
enR
∑
k1,k2,m
Wnt (∪V,Vˆ :Vˆ≺V TV (xk1k2m) ∩ ∪kˆ1 6=k1,mˆTVˆ (xkˆ1,k2,mˆ)|xk1k2m)
≤˙ 1
enR
∑
k1,k2,m
∑
V,Vˆ :Vˆ≺V
e−nD(V ||Wt|P )
∣∣∣TV (xk1k2m) ∩ ∪kˆ1 6=k1,mˆTVˆ (xkˆ1,k2,mˆ)∣∣∣
|TV (xk1k2m)|
=˙
1
enR
∑
k1,k2,m
max
V,Vˆ :Vˆ≺V
e−nD(V ||Wt|P )e−n|I(P,Vˆ )−RK−RM |+
= max
V,Vˆ :Vˆ≺V
exp−n
[
D(V ||Wt|P ) +
∣∣∣I(P, Vˆ )−RM −RK1∣∣∣+] ,
where the inequality is due to [2, Lemma 1], and everything else is by type class properties. Furthermore, it should
be clear that this bound is indeed tight as well due to the tightness of [2, Lemma 1].
Hence, their error exponent can be properly expressed as
max
V,Vˆ :V 6≺Vˆ or Vˆ≺V
exp−n
[
D(V ||Wt|P ) +
∣∣∣I(P, Vˆ )−RM −RK1∣∣∣+] .
This is very important because it establishes that
RM +RK1 < I(P,Wt)
is required for their code to work. To see this, observe that the pair (Wt,Wt) always satisfies Wt ≺Wt or Wt 6≺Wt.
Hence, their lower bound is always greater than
max
V,Vˆ :V 6≺Vˆ or Vˆ≺V
exp−n
[
D(V ||Wt|P ) +
∣∣∣I(P, Vˆ )−RM −RK1∣∣∣+]
≥ exp
(
−n
(
D(Wt||Wt|P ) + |I(P,Wt)−RM −RK1 |+
))
= exp
(
−n |I(P,Wt)−RM −RK1 |+
)
.
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